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CRIMINALLY PUNISHING A CORPORATE EXECUTIVE FOR 
FAILING TO BLOW THE WHISTLE ON THE ILLEGAL 
MISCONDUCT OF A COLLEAGUE 
Craig Ehrlich* 
Imagine that during a quarterly conference call with stock analysts, a 
corporation’s Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”) remains silent although he 
knows that another senior officer on the call has just made a material 
misrepresentation concerning the corporation’s financial statements. When 
asked by an analyst whether there were any “inventory issues,” the senior 
officer responded “no.” However, both the senior officer and the CFO 
know that the corporation has engaged in a “channel stuffing” scheme, 
temporarily increasing the corporation’s apparent revenues by selling 
excess inventory to distributors who neither needed nor wanted it, and 
paying them to accept it. The corporation uses channel stuffing near the end 
of each quarter in order to give the appearance that it is meeting its revenue 
targets. Both the scheme itself and the senior officer’s failure to reveal it are 
misleading.1 Our hypothetical CFO remains silent to avoid contradicting his 
colleague in public, to shield the fraud from public view, and, because his 
compensation is tied to the company’s stock price, for his personal gain. 
Although the fraud could have been nipped in the bud had the CFO 
spoken out, his silence allows it to grow and the resulting damage to 
multiply. Upon disclosure of the scheme a few months later, the 
corporation’s stock price quickly falls twenty-five percent, providing 
                                                                                                                           
 
* Associate Professor of Business Law, Babson College. With thanks to the Babson Research 
Fund and to Hillary Steinbrook, Esquire, for their funding and assistance. 
1 Lynn E. Turner, Chief Accountant, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Revenue Recognition Remarks 
(May 31, 2001), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch495.htm (The SEC has signaled its 
concerns about channel stuffing. “The Sunbeam case (AAER No. 1393) highlights many of these issues, 
including bill and hold and channel stuffing abuses, among others, and sends a message to registrants 
and their auditors—the SEC will aggressively attack fraudulent revenue recognition practices.”). 
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evidence (in the absence of other obvious reasons for the drop) of the 
materiality of the information misrepresented by the senior officer. 
Assuming that the senior officer’s misrepresentation is a violation of 
§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”)2 and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5,3 has our hypothetical 
CFO also violated these rules by remaining silent and failing to correct the 
misrepresentation? If so, and if his decision to remain silent was wilful, he 
can be held criminally liable.4 Will his liability be primary or secondary?5 
The answer more or less boils down to this: The CFO will be liable 
under § 10(b) if his silence was in breach of a duty to speak. If such a duty 
exists, it might be found in state corporation law (which imposes a duty of 
candor upon officers), Rule 10b-5 jurisprudence (which sometimes 
recognizes a relationship of trust and confidence between the shareholders 
of a corporation and its insiders), or possibly a general theory of criminal 
law. 
No court, to the knowledge of this writer, has held that there exists a 
duty to speak in the circumstances of our hypothetical case. Similar facts 
were presented in United States v. Schiff, and the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit held that there was no duty to speak and no 
violation of § 10(b).6 However, neither the government nor the court of 
appeals emphasized the defendant’s special status as the CFO of a publicly 
traded corporation. He and the speaker of the falsehood were grouped 
together and called “high corporate officers” by the government, a phrase 
rightly criticized by the court for its vagueness.7 There are, as well, other 
aspects to Schiff that may limit its effect. The court analyzed Schiff’s 
liability under Rule 10b-5(b), but, as discussed below, a better case might 
                                                                                                                           
 
2 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012). 
3 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2014). 
4 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2012) (“Any person who willfully violates any provision of this chapter . . . 
or any rule or regulation thereunder . . . shall upon conviction be fined not more than $5,000,000, or 
imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both . . . .” Willfully, in this context, means intentionally 
undertaking an act that one knows to be wrongful.); see also United States v. Tarallo, 380 F.3d 1174 
(9th Cir. 2004). 
5 Secondary liability imposes responsibility on those who aided the primary actor to commit the 
crime. In an armed robbery, the primary wrongdoer is the robber. Secondary wrongdoers include those 
who supplied the gun and the getaway car, knowing their purpose. 
6 United States v. Schiff, 602 F.3d 152 (3d Cir. 2010). 
7 Id. at 164–65. 
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be made under the other two subparts of the Rule, (a) and (c). The Third 
Circuit also holds a more restrictive view of omission liability than the 
Second, Ninth and Tenth Circuits. As this article will demonstrate, Schiff is 
flawed and the liability of our hypothetical CFO merits further exploration. 
Moreover, existing case law may be broad enough to permit the courts 
to recognize the existence of a CFO’s duty to speak in these circumstances. 
As well, it has been a decade since one writer called the officer’s duty of 
candor “an empty space” in the law.8 The CFO of a publicly traded 
corporation is entrusted with control of the firm’s financial reporting and 
public disclosure and is required by federal law to disclose to the firm’s 
auditors and audit committee any fraud that involves management or other 
employees who have a significant role in the issuer’s internal controls.9 
Under Delaware law, “Like directors, officers also have other contextual 
obligations as fiduciaries. These include the responsibility to disclose to 
their superior officer or principal ‘material information relevant to the 
affairs of the agency entrusted to them.’”10 Since the breach of a fiduciary 
duty to disclose can be a deceptive act in violation of § 10(b), it is possible 
that a CFO’s failure to disclose financial fraud to the corporation’s board of 
directors may in some circumstances violate the statute and Rule 10b-5. 
If a court can find a basis in existing law to impose a duty to speak 
upon a CFO who has merely witnessed another officer make a material 
misrepresentation, then the question whether to do so becomes one of 
policy. Maybe the Third Circuit was wise in its rejection of the 
government’s theory. There is already one person, the speaker of the 
falsehood, who is easily subject to prosecution. “More than enough is too 
much.”11 It is one thing for a prosecutor12 or a sentencing court13 to reward 
                                                                                                                           
 
8 Donald C. Langevoort, Agency Law Inside the Corporation: Problems of Candor and 
Knowledge, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1187, 1189 (2003). 
9 Investopedia, What does a Chief Financial Officer (CFO) do?, http://www.investopedia.com/ 
ask/answers/04/042204.asp (last visited Feb. 20, 2014). 
10 Hampshire Group, Ltd. v. Kuttner, CIV.A. 3607-VCS, 2010 WL 2739995 at 13 (Del. Ch. 
July 12, 2010). 
11 SEC v. Tambone, 597 F.3d 436, 452 (1st Cir. 2010) (Boudin, J., concurring). It has been 
estimated that “there are 4,500 criminal statutes and tens of thousands of regulations that carry criminal 
penalties, including prison.”; Gary Fields & Neil King, Jr., Task Force Aims to Lighten Criminal Code: 
Bipartisan Congressional Initiative Targets Bloated Federal Provisions Cited by Critics for Driving Up 
Incarceration Rates, WALL ST. J., May 5, 2013; Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Public Choice Theory and 
Overcriminalization, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 715, 720 (2013) (Overcriminalization has been called 
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a corporation for voluntarily reporting its own wrongdoing to authorities, or 
to protect or pay a bounty to a whistleblower,14 but we do not in America 
criminally punish people who choose to look the other way when they 
witness a violation of law. To do so evokes thoughts of a surveillance state 
whose citizens must denounce each other to the authorities. 
While there are persuasive arguments against punishing silence, this 
writer believes that the unique role played by a corporate CFO justifies 
judicial recognition of an affirmative duty to respond to misrepresentations 
by other corporate officers concerning the corporation’s financial statement. 
Our silent man is not simply some accidental passerby; he is the chief 
financial officer of a publicly traded corporation, the high priest of the 
integrity of the firm’s finances. Surely all who rely upon him, including the 
board and the stockholders, would expect him to be intolerant of deception. 
That he may be deliberately indifferent to a financial statement fraud 
committed at his side, yet bear no legal responsibility, goes too far. The law 
should deter such silence, just as the law requires many categories of 
persons to report witnessed wrongdoing, and to act for the protection of 
others. 
In our hypothetical, the senior officer’s misrepresentation concerned 
not some obscure infraction among the multitude of crimes to be found in 
manifold statutes and regulations, but securities fraud, malum in se, 
something that a CFO ought to recognize when he encounters it. Is it 
unreasonable, then, to expect that the CFO of publicly traded corporation 
would also know that he ought to say something because it is his job to do 
so and because others—including the audience on that analyst call—would 
expect him to do so? A corporation may be criminally liable if its 
                                                                                                                           
 
“an increasingly important issue in modern-day criminal law.” It involves not only the sheer number of 
crimes but also the elimination of mens rea in public welfare offenses and administrative regulatory 
crimes. “If the penal code regulates too much conduct that is beyond the common law definitions of 
crimes or that is not inherently blameworthy, several problems arise. It becomes a formidable task for 
the average person to know what the law forbids . . . .”). 
12 E.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL 9-28.700 (2008) 
(assessing the value of a corporation’s cooperation). 
13 FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C4.1 (2013) (reduction of fine based on an 
organization’s substantial assistance to authorities). 
14 Section 806 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 established protection for employees of 
publicly traded companies who provide evidence of fraud. Section 922 of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 
established a whistleblower bounty program. 
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employees violate the law; it must be within the CFO’s brief to assure the 
integrity the corporation’s financial statements, at least to the extent of 
repudiating a material falsehood concerning the financial statements spoken 
at his side by a colleague. In other cases, a contractual relationship has been 
the source of a legal duty to act; the failure to act has been a criminal 
omission. A CFO’s employment responsibilities distinguish him from all 
others who could have prevented or corrected the fraud, but who have too 
attenuated a connection to it to be held criminally responsible. 
The courts in Rule 10b-5 cases recognize a duty to correct one’s own 
misstatement. There is no duty to correct another’s misstatement, but the 
courts do recognize a duty to speak arising from a fiduciary relationship, 
such as a CFO owes to the corporation and its board of directors. In short, 
this writer argues that, under existing law, a court would be justified in 
holding a CFO criminally liable for failing to report to the board of 
directors a statement, made by another officer of the corporation, which is 
materially misleading concerning the corporation’s financial statements. 
Further, given the special position of the CFO, doing so would be consistent 
with well-established public policies. 
Part I of this article explores the special status of the CFO, as it relates 
to whether the CFO should have a duty to speak. Part II, examines laws that 
require one to act for the protection of another and to report offenses 
committed by another, and then examines the general theory of criminal 
omissions. Holding our CFO criminally responsible for his silence would 
be wholly consistent with the general theory. Part III examines the duty of 
candor owed by a corporate officer. It concludes that such a duty exists, but 
is owed to the board of directors rather than to the stockholders of the 
corporation. Part IV discusses the circumstances in which silence 
constitutes a breach of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. It concludes that § 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5 do not impose a federal duty upon our CFO to speak to the 
stockholders, but that our CFO’s breach of his duty of candor to the board 
is a violation of Rule 10b-5 if his silence was “in connection with” the 
purchase and sale of the corporation’s securities. Part V explores the “in 
connection with” requirement in greater detail. Since our hypothetical CFO 
remained silent in order to affect the market price of the corporation’s 
stock, his failure to inform the board is in connection with the purchase and 
sales of the corporation’s securities and constitutes a violation of Rule 10b-
5. 
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Having provisionally established that our CFO committed a primary 
violation of § 10(b), we consider in Part VI the possibility of secondary 
liability. We consider and reject the possibility of liability for aiding and 
abetting his colleague’s fraud. In the course of examining aiding and 
abetting under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, we encounter an interesting wrinkle 
concerning primary liability, and turn our attention to Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Janus Capital Group v. First Deriv. Traders, decided one year 
after Schiff.15 We then resume consideration of secondary liability, look at 
the possibility of control person liability for our CFO, and conclude that 
there is a strong case to be made for an SEC civil enforcement action. In 
Part VII, we come to terms with Schiff, and critically analyze the Third 
Circuit’s opinion. We conclude that the opinion is flawed, and so cannot be 
the last word on the subject. Part VIII summarizes and restates our main 
conclusions. While the focus of this article is on criminal liability, we also 
consider SEC enforcement actions to the extent that they illuminate the 
requirements for criminal liability. 
PART I: THE CFO’S SPECIAL STATUS 
Sections 302 and 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 are evidence 
of the public’s understanding and expectation regarding the duties of the 
CFO of a publicly traded corporation. § 302,16 a civil provision, required 
the SEC to adopt final rules under which the principal executive and 
principal financial officers of a company filing periodic reports under 
§§ 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act must provide a certification in each 
quarterly and annual report filed with the Commission. The SEC adopted 
Exchange Act Rules 13a-1417 and 15d-14,18 which require the certifications 
to be filed as an exhibit to the report. As part of their certifications, 15 
U.S.C. 7241(a)(5) requires that the CFO must certify that he has disclosed 
to the audit committee of the corporation’s board of directors any fraud that 
he knows about which involves management. 
                                                                                                                           
 
15 Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011). 
16 15 U.S.C. § 7241. 
17 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-14 (2014). 
18 17 C.F.R. § 240.5d-14 (2014). 
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(5) the signing officers have disclosed to the issuer’s auditors and the audit 
committee of the board of directors (or persons fulfilling the equivalent 
function)— 
(A) all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal controls 
which could adversely affect the issuer’s ability to record, process, summarize, 
and report financial data and have identified for the issuer’s auditors any 
material weaknesses in internal controls; and 
(B) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other 
employees who have a significant role in the issuer’s internal controls; 
(emphasis added) 
Section 906,19 a criminal provision, contains a certification 
requirement that is separate and distinct from the § 302 certification. It 
establishes the duty of chief executive officers and chief financial officers 
of publicly traded companies to certify the accuracy of the company’s 
periodic financial reports required under §§ 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange 
Act. The statute further defines the content of the certifications in 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 1350(b) and (c) and establishes the criminal penalties for violations in 18 
U.S.C. § 1350(c). 
(a) Certification of periodic financial reports. Each periodic report containing 
financial statements filed by an issuer with the Securities Exchange Commission 
pursuant to §§ 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 
78m(a) or 78o(d)) shall be accompanied by a written statement by the chief 
executive officer and chief financial officer (or equivalent thereof) of the issuer. 
(b) Content. The statement required under subsection (a) shall certify that the 
periodic report containing the financial statements fully complies with the 
requirements of §§ 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 
U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)) and that information contained in the periodic report 
fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of 
operations of the issuer. 
(c) Criminal penalties. Whoever— 
(1) certifies any statement as set forth in subsections (a) and (b) of this section 
knowing that the periodic report accompanying the statement does not comport 
with all the requirements set forth in this section shall be fined not more than 
$1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both; or 
                                                                                                                           
 
19 18 U.S.C. § 1350. 
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(2) willfully certifies any statement as set forth in subsections (a) and (b) of this 
section knowing that the periodic report accompanying the statement does not 
comport with all the requirements set forth in this section shall be fined not more 
than $5,000,000, or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. 
The duty to report created by § 302 is not subject to the criminal 
provision of § 906. However, “[a]n officer providing a false certification 
potentially could be subject to Commission action for violating §§ 13(a) or 
15(d) of the Exchange Act and to both Commission and private actions for 
violating § 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Exchange Act Rule 10b-5.”20 
Moreover, an officer who “willfully” makes a false § 302 certification may 
be liable for criminal violation of the Exchange Act. 
There is no false certification in our hypothetical and no direct 
violation of these rules. More broadly, however, the statutes and regulations 
signal that the public expects the CFO of a publicly traded corporation not 
to countenance any instance of material financial statement fraud. This is 
corroborated by an October 2004 survey conducted by CFO Magazine and 
the National Association of Corporate Directors (“NACD”). Of 434 NACD 
members, forty-two percent of respondents who sit on public company 
boards said the CFO’s primary role in corporate governance should be to 
“lead in ensuring that the letter of the law is met.”21 Another twenty percent 
believe the CFO should go further, pushing “for change above and beyond 
the letter of the law.”22 
The CFO of a publicly traded corporation has a special status. His job 
is to ensure the integrity of the corporation’s financial statements, thereby 
protecting the stockholders. Both the publicly traded corporation that hired 
our hypothetical CFO and the investing public have a serious and sustained 
expectations that, the CFO will take positive action to “rescue” the 
corporation from the adverse impact of another employee’s financial 
statement fraud. 
                                                                                                                           
 
20 Certification of Disclosure in Companies’ Quarterly and Annual Reports, Exchange Act 
Release Nos. 33-8124, 34-46427, IC-25722 (Aug. 29, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
rules/final/33-8124.htm#P161_38746. 
21 Roy Harris, Across the Board, CFO MAG., Jan. 17, 2005, at 40, available at http:// 
ww2.cfo.com/risk-compliance/2005/01/across-the-board/. 
22 Id. 
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PART II 
We turn now to an examination of duties imposed by law on certain 
persons to act for the protection of others. The examples discussed below 
will enable us to construct an external frame of reference by which to test 
the conclusions drawn later about the culpability of our CFO under current 
law. Our conclusions about precedent and policy differ sharply from that of 
the Third Circuit in Schiff. We seek, and find, corroboration. A CFO’s duty 
to speak would be fully consistent with those laws that impose a duty to 
report witnessed wrongdoing and with the general theory of criminal 
liability for omissions. 
A. Acting for the Protection of Others 
Although “[t]he common law traditionally took a hard line, rejecting 
any legal duty to be a good Samaritan[],”23 there are manifold exceptions to 
the general rule. For example, it is a crime for any person to be indifferent 
to the distress of a child in California. One type of the offense of child 
endangerment punishes indifference even to non-life threatening 
circumstances. Under California Penal Code: Any person who, under 
circumstances or conditions other than those likely to produce great bodily 
harm or death, willfully . . . permits any child to suffer . . . unjustifiable 
physical pain or mental suffering . . . is guilty of a misdemeanor.24 
Mere indifference to the distress of another is also punishable under 
Minnesota, Rhode Island, and Vermont statutes that require someone at the 
scene of an emergency, or who knows that another is exposed to grave 
physical harm, to give “reasonable assistance.”25 More than a dozen civil 
law jurisdictions have enacted “bad Samaritan” laws.26 
                                                                                                                           
 
23 Stockberger v. United States, 332 F.3d 479, 480 (7th Cir. 2003). 
24 CAL. PENAL CODE § 273a (2014); see generally Michael T. Cahill, Attempt by Omission, 94 
IOWA L. REV. 1207, 1237–39 (2009) (discussing endangerment prosecutions). 
25 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604A.01 (2013) (Violation is a petty misdemeanor.); R.I. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. § 11-56-1 (2013) (Violation is punishable by a term in prison of not more than six months, a fine 
of up to $500, or both.); VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 12, § 519(c) (2013) (The penalty for violation is a fine of 
not more than $100.). 
26 Ken Levy, Killing, Letting Die and the Case for Mildly Punishing Bad Samaritanism, 44 GA. 
L. REV. 607, 616–17 (2010). 
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In addition to statutes that require persons to render aid to strangers, 
established common law imposes a duty on certain high corporate officers 
to take action to protect the public from dangers that they know have been 
created by other corporate employees. Consider a simple criminal case 
involving a duty to warn of a harm one has created. A trucker who 
negligently dumped more than a ton of gravel on the highway saw what he 
had done, and drove away. The trucker failed to warn anyone of the danger, 
in violation of a duty imposed upon him by state statute, and an 
approaching motorist was killed when she hit the gravel and lost control of 
her car. If a person acts culpably to imperil another, he or she has a legal 
duty to rescue the victim. Courts have imposed criminal liability for a 
failure to act in such circumstances. A Maryland Appeals Court stated in 
dictum that these facts would have been enough to convict the trucker of 
involuntary manslaughter, had the indictment charged it.27 
Let’s add a fact. What if the trucking firm’s chief operating officer had 
been riding along as a passenger? As chief of operations (COO), he is 
supposed to see that firm’s operator’s act in accordance with law. However, 
although he saw and understood everything, he said and did nothing. 
Should he bear some measure of criminal responsibility for the death of the 
motorist, which he could have avoided had he done his job? One might 
argue the trucker’s prosecution is enough. Criminal law is potent stuff and 
should not be administered too liberally. The rule of lenity might be cited 
broadly as an example of this guiding principle.28 On the other hand, the 
COO was no mere bystander. It was his job to act, and he failed to do his 
                                                                                                                           
 
27 State v. DiGennaro, 3 A.3d 1201, 1208–09 (2010); Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of 
California, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976) (The failure to warn others of the danger of physical harm can also 
give rise to tort liability in certain circumstances, such as the duty of possessor of land to warn a licensee 
of dangerous conditions, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 342, the duty of a therapist to use reasonable 
care (often, to warn) if a patient presents a serious danger of violence to another, and the duty of a 
product manufacturer to warn about non-obvious dangers that cause physical injury or pose safety 
concerns.); Daugherty v. American Honda Motor Co., 144 Cal. App. 4th 824, 836 (2006); cf. Woods v. 
Maytag, 807 F. Supp. 2d 112, 125 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Although normally this duty to disclose arises in 
the context of direct business transactions, courts have also imposed this duty on a manufacturer who 
has exclusive knowledge of a product defect or danger.”). 
28 Courts should interpret ambiguity in a criminal statute in the light most favorable to the 
defendant. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 679 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
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duty. Criminal liability is appropriate when the officer has knowledge of the 
wrong and the power to control it but fails to do so.29 
Imagine now, that at a press conference, a high ranking official at an 
imperiled nuclear power plant falsely denies rumors that the company is 
planning to release highly toxic steam into the atmosphere that evening. 
The steam is released, leading to tragedy. Had the official told the truth, or 
had the other executives who were also present corrected him, the public 
could have taken simple precautionary measures to avoid the harm. 
If the COO in the spilled gravel example should bear liability, then so 
should the nuclear plant executives. And, if this is true in those two cases, 
then why should the CFO in our hypothetical case of securities fraud escape 
                                                                                                                           
 
29 Sea Horse Ranch v. Super. Ct. of San Mateo County, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 681, 688–89 (Ct. App. 
1994) (corporate president who knew of a potential risk and had the authority to prevent it but failed to 
do so could be charged with involuntary manslaughter); People v. Conway, 117 Cal. Rptr. 251, 258 (Ct. 
App. 1974) (President of a car dealership held criminally liable for false advertising because he had 
control over the activities of the dealership and permitted the unlawful practices to continue after being 
informed of them.). Tort law also imposes a duty in certain circumstances to control a third party’s 
conduct to prevent harm to another individual. The general rule is stated in Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 314 (1965): “The fact that the actor realizes or should realize that action on his part is necessary 
for another’s aid or protection does not of itself impose upon him a duty to take such action.” The rule 
has been carried over to the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm 
§ 37 (2012). As stated in the Second Restatement, a duty to take some affirmative action to aid or protect 
may arise where a special relationship exists between parties. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 
(1965). Some of these special relationships include the relation between a parent and a child, an 
employer and an employee, and someone who takes charge of a person whom he knows or should know 
to be likely to cause bodily harm to others if not controlled. §§ 316, 317, 319. The rules too are carried 
over into the Third Restatement. Section 41 of the Third Restatement describes the duty of a parent to 
prevent dependent children child from harming others, the affirmative duty of a custodian to control the 
conduct of those in its custody from harming third parties, an employers’ duty to control the conduct of 
its employees from harming others, and a mental health professional’s duty to prevent harm to others 
caused by his or her patients. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND 
EMOTIONAL HARM § 41 (2012). For example, in Volpe v. Gallagher, a woman allowed her mentally-ill 
son to live with her in her home, where he kept several firearms. Volpe, 821 A.2d at 702–03 (R.I. 2003). 
The son killed the defendant’s neighbor with a shotgun that he kept in the house. Id. at 703. She owed a 
duty to exercise reasonable care in controlling her son. “[U]nder these circumstances, defendant knew or 
had reason to know that she had the ability to control her son’s conduct on her property merely by—as 
she herself admitted—telling him to remove the guns and ammunition from her house, and, if he failed 
to do so, by removing them herself.” Id. at 709. The Restatement rule concerns the prevention of 
physical harm, not economic harm, but the analogy is apt. Much as one who has charge of a dangerous 
person must exercise care to control the person and prevent harm to others, so too the CFO has charge of 
the firm’s finances and should be required to exercise care to prevent harm to others caused by the 
dissemination of false information—at least to the extent of correcting a financial statement 
misstatement made at the CFO’s side during a public analyst call. 
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liability? The only difference is the nature of the harm suffered: physical 
injury as opposed to monetary loss. 
But why should that be a meaningful distinction? An alien who has 
committed a crime of “moral turpitude” is ineligible for admission to the 
country,30 and fraud is “universally recognized” as falling into the category 
of moral turpitude.31 Debts for money obtained by fraud have long been 
ineligible for discharge in bankruptcy, and Congress, in 2002, added 
§ 523(a)(19) to the Bankruptcy Code, which specifically denies discharge 
for a securities fraud debt.32 Tort law exceptionally provides remedy for 
purely economic harm, if caused by fraud,33 and even common law fraud is 
sufficiently reprehensible to warrant an award of punitive damages.34 
Congress made fraud a crime when perpetrated in connection with the 
purchase or sale of a security as well as in many other contexts. The 
penalties for securities fraud can be heavy. The crime is punishable by a 
fine of not more than $5 million ($25 million if the defendant is a 
corporation) and a term of imprisonment of not more than 20 years.35 
B. The Failure to Report Offenses Committed by Another 
More common are laws that punish indifference to a witnessed crime. 
Some European legal systems, for example, require people to report known 
crime.36 United States common law originally required people to report 
                                                                                                                           
 
30 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (2012). 
31 Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 232 (1951). 
32 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(2)(A), (a)(4), (a)(11) (2012). 
33 The economic-loss doctrine bars most negligence suits for purely financial loss. It is based on 
the view commercial disputes ought to be resolved according to the principles of commercial law, rather 
than according to tort principles designed for accidents that cause personal injury or property damage. 
An exception allows a suit for fraud against one’s contract counterpart. Schreiber Foods v. Lei Wang, 
651 F.3d 678 (7th Cir. 2011); Rardin v. T&D Machine Handling, 890 F.2d 24 (7th Cir. 1989). 
34 Newton v. Standard Fire Ins., 229 S.E.2d 297, 302 (N.C. 1976). 
35 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2012). 
36 In Ireland, Section 9 of the Offences Against the State (Amendment) Act, 1998, provides that a 
person shall be guilty of an offense if they fail to disclose to the police information to prevent or punish 
the commission of a “serious offence” by another. Offences Against the State (Amendment) Act 1998 
(Act No. 39/1998) (Ir.), available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1998/en/act/pub/0039/sec0009.html. 
As well, section 19 of the Criminal Justice Act 2011 makes it an offense for a person not to report to 
police information which he knows or believes might be of material assistance in preventing the 
commission of certain offenses or obtaining the conviction of any persons for those relevant offenses. 
Criminal Justice Act 2011 (Act No. 22/2011) (Ir.), available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/ 
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crime to the authorities, but does not today. Moreover, statutes, which once 
were interpreted as requiring members of the public to report crime, are 
now applied only when a person has taken some affirmative act to further 
the crime. Instead of a general duty to report, many jurisdictions in the 
United States have enacted statutes requiring certain specific persons to 
report certain specific offenses committed by another, punishing the failure 
to do so. 
We examine laws that require members of the general public to report 
crime, the general duty to report violations of law imposed upon those who 
have assumed a greater responsibility, and then survey a variety of specific 
offense reporting statutes. 
Laws That Require Members of the General Public to Report Crime 
A citizen’s duty to “raise the ‘hue and cry’ and report felonies to the 
authorities,” was an established tenet of Anglo-Saxon law at least as early 
as the 13th century.37 As recently as 1923, it seems to have been a common 
law crime in Delaware for someone present at the scene of a felony to 
“willfully” fail and neglect to make any effort to bring the felon to justice.38 
By 1940, though, the Supreme Court of Michigan declared the 
common law crime of misprision of felony to be “wholly unsuited to 
American criminal law,”39 and a 1945 law review note concluded that the 
common law crime was “obsolete.”40 The final nail in the coffin for the 
common law crime may have been from a state appeals court in Florida in 
1972, which stated, 
                                                                                                                           
 
2011/en/act/pub/0022/sec0019.html. “The duty to notify, or to take other steps, at the planning stage of 
the crime is also found in several European legal systems.” Miriam Gur-Arye, A Failure to Prevent 
Crime—Should it be Criminal?, 20 CRIMINAL JUSTICE ETHICS 3, 6 (2001). A more passive approach is 
(or was) to be found in the Belgian Code of Criminal Instruction (1978). Article 30 provided that any 
person having knowledge of a criminal offense must report the case to the authorities. The obligation 
was strictly a moral one which was not enforced by any kind of sanction. CODE D’INSTRUCTION 
CRIMINELLE [C.I.CR.] 30 (Belg.), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/App/publications/abstract.aspx?ID 
=60328. 
37 Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 557 (1980) (internal citations omitted). 
38 State v. Biddle, 124 A. 804 (Del. Gen. Sess. 1923). 
39 People v. Lefkovitz, 293 N.W. 642, 643 (Mich. 1940). 
40 Raymond Huevler, Criminal Law—Misprision of Felony. Failure to Report Knowledge of the 
Commission of a Felony Insufficient for Conviction, 32 VA. L. REV. 170, 171 (1945). 
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While it may be desirable, even essential, that we encourage citizens to “get 
involved” to help reduce crime, they ought not be adjudicated criminals 
themselves if they don’t. The fear of such a consequence is a fear from which 
our traditional concepts of peace and quietude guarantee freedom. We cherish 
the right to mind our own business when our own best interests dictate.41 
The common law crime probably no longer exists in any jurisdiction in the 
United States.42 
On their face, eight state statutes require a member of the general 
public who has witnessed a defined crime (usually a crime of violence) to 
report to law enforcement.43 However, these statutes are rarely enforced. 
The federal misprision of felony statute punishes one’s failure to report 
known or likely criminal activity, although recent case law strongly 
suggests that mere inaction is not enough to warrant conviction.44 In 1790, 
Congress enacted a federal misprision statute that is essentially the same as 
18 U.S.C. § 4 today. The statute derives from the English common law 
offense.45 It states, 
Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony cognizable by 
a court of the United States, conceals and does not as soon as possible make 
known the same to some judge or other person in civil or military authority 
under the United States, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more 
than three years, or both. 
The meaning of the word “conceals” has changed over time. “The 
early cases started with the assumption that an ordinary citizen had a duty 
to control crime, to raise the hue and cry, and they questioned whether the 
                                                                                                                           
 
41 Holland v. State, 302 So. 2d 806, 810 (Fla. App. 1974). 
42 Gabriel D.M. Ciociola, Misprision of Felony and Its Progeny, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 697, 721 
(2003). As of 2003, only two states had misprision of felony statutes, South Dakota and Ohio. Id. at 726; 
Levy, supra note 26, at 620 n.27. 
43 CAL. PENAL CODE § 152.3 (West Supp. 2013); FLA. STAT. § 794.027 (West 2014); MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268 § 40 (West 2013); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 269 § 18 (West 2013); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.22 (2013); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-1-5.1 (West 2013); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 9.69.100 (West 2013). HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-1.6 (West 2013) requires an attempt to obtain aid. The 
failure to transport a suffocated child to the hospital, in violation of this duty, resulted in conviction for 
involuntary manslaughter. State v. Martinez, 68 P.3d 606 (Haw. 2002); WIS. STAT. § 940.34 (2013); 
State v. La Plante, 521 N.W.2d 448 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (The host of a party witnessed the brutal 
beating of one of her guests by a group of other guests, but waited to summon assistance, convicted for 
violating the statute.); Eugene Volokh, Duty to Rescue/Report Statutes, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 3, 
2009), available at http://www.volokh.com/2009/11/03/duty-to-rescuereport-statutes/. 
44 18 U.S.C. § 4 (2012). 
45 United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 480 F.3d 62, 71 (1st Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
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citizen failed in that duty. The modern cases assume the duty rests with law 
enforcement, and they question whether the citizen interfered with that 
duty.”46 Thus, the elements of the modern crime are that: “(1) the principal 
committed and completed the felony alleged; (2) the defendant had 
knowledge of the fact; (3) the defendant failed to notify the authorities; and 
(4) the defendant took affirmative steps to conceal the crime of the 
principal.”47 Many courts have held that “the statute requires some positive 
act of concealment; mere failure to reveal one’s knowledge of a federal 
felony is not made criminal by the statute.”48 With regard to what 
constitutes a positive act of concealment, a 2003 law review article 
concluded that mere silence is insufficient to support a conviction for 
misprision, that lying to authorities about a crime is an act sufficient to 
constitute concealment, and, citing United States v. Ciambrone,49 that 
making truthful but incomplete statements may not amount to 
concealment.50 
The point remains unsettled. In United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 
the court, en banc, wrote, “[W]hile this court and the Supreme Court may 
someday adopt the majority rule in the circuits that an affirmative act is 
required for a misprision offense, there is now no binding precedent to that 
effect.”51 
Caraballo was a police officer who was involved with others in a drug 
crime. He nonetheless reported the crime, imperfectly, by leaving an 
anonymous and incomplete tip with the Drug Enforcement Agency. He 
pleaded guilty to misprision in exchange for the narcotics charges being 
dropped. He then sought to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that he could 
not be guilty of misprision since he did not act to conceal the drug crime. 
He could not show “plain error,” however, and his plea stood. The court 
expressly left open the possibility that mere failure to report may be all that 
the statute requires. 
                                                                                                                           
 
46 Christoper M. Curenton, The Past, Present, and Future of 18 U.S.C. § 4: An Exploration of the 
Federal Misprision of Felony Statute, 55 ALA. L. REV. 183, 186 (2003). 
47 Id. at 185 (2003). 
48 Ciociola, supra note 42, at 722. 
49 United States v. Ciambrone, 750 F.2d 1416, 1418 (9th Cir. 1984). 
50 Curenton, supra note 46, at 186. 
51 United States v. Caraballo-Rodriquez, 480 F.3d 62 at 70. 
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If the statute requires more, then one may wonder what remains of the 
crime. An act of physical concealment resembles an obstruction of justice 
crime,52 lying to the authorities resembles the false statement crime,53 and 
either might make one an accessory after the fact.54 
The apparent demise of the crime of misprision of felony is probably a 
good thing. Given the vast numbers of federal felonies, it would be an 
immense task for anyone to be able to know when they have witnessed 
one.55 
General Duty upon Those Who Have Assumed a Greater 
Responsibility 
Attendant to their special status, certain members of the armed services 
and law enforcement are required to report known offenses. United States 
Navy Regulations, § 1137, provides that, 
[p]ersons in the naval service shall report as soon as possible to superior 
authority all offenses under the Uniform Code of Military Justice which come 
under their observation, except when such persons are themselves already 
criminally involved in such offenses at the time such offenses first come under 
their observation.56 
A law enforcement officer is also under a duty to report crime, or at 
least to report crimes with which he is involved. Obviously, an officer 
                                                                                                                           
 
52 See 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (2012). 
53 See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2012). 
54 See 18 U.S.C. § 3 (2012). Thus, when the United States, in 1996, charged a corporation with 
misprision for the first time, the indictment alleged that Daiwa Bank officials “engaged in a complex 
scheme” to prevent the Federal Reserve from discovering the underlying crime: massive long term 
concealed treading losses. Daiwa settled the charges by paying a $340 million fine. Cynthia E. Carrasco 
& Michael K. Dupee, Corporate Criminal Liability, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 445, 456–57 (1999). 
55 “At present, there are an estimated 4,500 federal crimes in the U.S. Code[.]” Press Release, 
House Judiciary Committee Creates Bipartisan Task Force on Over-Criminalization (May 5, 2013), 
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/index.cfm/2013/5/housejudiciarycommitteecreatesbipartisantask 
forceonovercriminalization. 
56 United States Navy General Regulations, ch. 11 § 1137 (Defense Logistics Agency 2011), 
available at http://doni.daps.dla.mil/US%20Navy%20Regulations/Chapter%2011%20-%20General 
%20Regulations.pdf. 
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enjoys some measure of discretion not to pull over every motorist who 
speeds.57 
The CFO of a publicly traded corporation can be likened to 
management’s top financial cop. He or she often presides over the 
corporation’s accounting and financial compliance and internal audit 
functions.58 
Specific Offense Reporting Statutes 
Many statutes impose a duty to report on members of a particular 
profession, who, in the course of their work, can be expected to encounter 
and recognize signs that certain crimes are being committed. These statutes 
often concern the abuse or neglect of the old and the young or violent 
assault upon another. A specific duty to report may cover various offenses, 
including money laundering or other financial misconduct, environmental 
violations, treason, sexual assault, domestic violence, child pornography, 
child abuse, elder abuse, animal neglect, crimes involving gunshot wounds, 
and other violent crimes.59 Although none directly supports the duty of a 
CFO to report or correct material financial misstatements of a colleague, 
such a duty would fit comfortably in this pattern. For example: 
• Under New York State Penal Law § 265.25, any injury caused by 
the discharge of a firearm, and any injury which is likely to cause 
death inflicted by a sharp or pointed instrument, must be reported 
at once to the police authorities by the attending physician.60 
                                                                                                                           
 
57 Devoney v. Retirement Board of the Policemen’s Annuity and Benefit Fund of the City of 
Chicago, 746 N.E.2d 836, 843 (Ill. App. 2001) (“By participating in a scheme to defraud with others and 
concealing the scheme, petitioner breached his duty to report crime, which is a duty arising out of or in 
connection with his service as a policeman. The public demands faithfulness from police officers to their 
duty to report and arrest others involved in criminal activity.”). 
58 The majority of public companies’ top internal auditors split their reporting duties between the 
audit committee and the CFO. Sarah Johnson, Should Internal Audit Report to the CFO?, CFO.COM 
(Oct. 13, 2006), available at http://ww2.cfo.com/accounting-tax/2006/10/should-internal-audit-report-
to-the-cfo/. 
59 Cahill, supra note 24, at 1236–37; Sandra GuerraThompson, The White-Collar Police Force: 
“Duty to Report” Statutes in Criminal Law Theory, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 3, 3–4 (2002). 
60 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.25 (McKinney 2014) The failure to do so is punishable as a Class A 
misdemeanor. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.15 (McKinney 2013). Ohio requires certain health care 
practitioners to report gunshot, stab wounds, burn injuries and domestic violence injuries. Violation is a 
misdemeanor. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.22 (West 2013). See also MO. ANN. STAT. § .350 (West 
 
272 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 32:255 
 
Vol. 32, No. 2 (2014) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2014.66 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
• Nearly all states and territories designate professions whose 
members are mandated by law to report child maltreatment, 
including: social workers, school personnel, health-care workers, 
mental health professionals, child care providers, medical 
examiners and law enforcement officers.61 In a notable case, the 
director of athletics and a senior vice president of Penn State 
University were charged with failing to report child abuse 
committed by the convicted sexual predator and former Penn 
State football coach Jerry Sandusky, in violation of Pa. C.S. 
§§ 6301–6365 (2014). The crime is “punishable by up to 90 days 
in prison and a $200 fine.”62 
• Under § 4 of the Illinois Elder Abuse and Neglect Act, when an 
older adult is unable to seek assistance, certain licensed 
professionals and state employees must report, within 24 hours, 
any suspected abuse, neglect or financial exploitation to the 
Department on Aging’s Elder Abuse and Neglect Program.63 
• Twenty-nine states impose a mandatory duty on mental health 
professionals to report information about patients who may 
become violent.64 In most cases, failure is not punishable by the 
                                                                                                                           
 
2014) (failure is punishable as an Infraction under § 560.016), TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. 
§ 161.041 (West 2013) (failure is punishable as a misdemeanor under § 161.043). 
61 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Mandatory Reporters of Child Abuse and 
Neglect 2 (Aug. 2012), available at https://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/ 
manda.pdf). 
62 Press Release, Pennsylvania Attorney General, Child sex charges filed against Jerry Sandusky; 
two top Penn State University officials charged with perjury & failure to report suspected child abuse 
(Nov. 5, 2011), available at http://www.attorneygeneral.gov/press.aspx?id=6270. The field continues to 
be the focus of legislative attention. “Approximately 119 bills in 37 states have been introduced in the 
2013 legislative session on the reporting of suspected child abuse and neglect. Twenty three bills have 
been enacted.” National Conference of State Legislatures, Mandatory Reporting of Child Abuse and 
Neglect (June 27, 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/human-services/mandatory-rprtg-of-child-
abuse-and-neglect-2013.aspx. 
63 Failure is punishable by the relevant licensing board as an administrative offense or as a Class 
A misdemeanor. 320 ILL. COMP. STAT. 20/4 (2013); see section 4(e) of the Act. For a 50-state survey of 
elder abuse reporting laws, current as of December 31, 2006, see Lori Steigel & Ellen Klem, Reporting 
Requirements: Provisions and Citations in Adult Protective Services Laws, By State, A.B.A. COMM’N 
ON L. & AGING (2007), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/aging/docs/ 
MandatoryReportingProvisionsChart.authcheckdam.pdf. 
64 Mental Health Professionals’ Duty to Warn, 50 State Table, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES (Jan. 2013), available at http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/mental-health-
professionals-duty-to-warn.aspx. 
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state. Rather, the discharge of the duty entitles the practitioner to 
immunity from civil suit.65 
• A few states require auto repair garages to notify police of cars 
showing evidence of having been in an accident or struck by a 
bullet. In one state only, Indiana, is there a penalty for 
noncompliance.66 
In contrast to the foregoing examples, which seek to protect persons 
from physical injury, the following concern financial wrongdoing: 
• Under 12 C.F.R. § 21.11 (2014), issued by the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, national banks are required to report 
certain known or suspected criminal offenses, and transactions 
over $5,000 that they suspect involve money laundering or violate 
the Bank Secrecy Act. The bank must prepare a Suspicious 
Activity Report, which it files with the Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network of the Department of the Treasury.67 
Similar regulations apply to other financial institutions.68 
• § 10A(b) of the Exchange Act requires the auditor of a publicly 
traded company to notify the SEC, 
if an illegal act was been detected in the course of the audit 
that has a material effect on the financial statements on the 
issuer; and the auditor communicated this to the audit 
committee of the board of directors of the issuer; but senior 
management has not taken, and the board of directors has not 
caused senior management to take, timely and appropriate 
                                                                                                                           
 
65 But see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.51(B) (1999) (providing that the license professional 
“may be made subject to disciplinary action by an entity with licensing or other regulatory authority 
over the professional”). 
66 Ciociola, supra note 42, at 730–31. 
67 See Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) Program, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE 
CURRENCY, http://www.occ.gov/tools-forms/forms/bank-operations/suspicious-activity-report-program 
.html. The failure to maintain an effective anti-money laundering program in violation of 31 U.S.C. 
§ 5318(h)(l) is criminally punishable under § 5322(a). See Press Release, United States Department of 
Justice, North Carolina Bank Agrees to Pay $400,000 in Restitution to Victims of Investment Fraud 
Scheme It Failed to Detect and Report (Apr. 27, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/ 
April/11-crm-533.html (a recent enforcement that was resolved by deferred prosecution agreement). 
68 E.g., 31 C.F.R. §§ 103.15–103.19 (2014) (requiring other banks, mutual funds, insurance 
companies, and securities brokers and dealers, among others, to file SARs in defined circumstances). 
See also 12 C.F.R. §§ 208.62, 211.5(k), 225.4(f) (2014) (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System); 61 FR 6095 (1996) (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation); 12 C.F.R. § 748 (2014) (National 
Credit Union Administration); 12 C.F.R. § 563.180 (2014) (Office of Thrift Supervision). 
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remedial action.69 A willful violation of the Exchange Act is 
criminally punishable.70 
• Rule 8.3 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (2005) 
states that a “lawyer having knowledge that another lawyer has 
committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that 
raises a substantial question as to that lawyer’s honesty, 
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall 
inform the appropriate professional authority.” The rule is 
enforced administratively and there is no criminal punishment for 
its violation.71 
• Federal “[e]mployees shall disclose waste, fraud, abuse, and 
corruption to appropriate authorities.”72 Although phrased in 
mandatory language, the rule seems to be a general principle of 
ethical conduct, without sanction for its violation. 
These examples teach a few things about a duty to report witnessed 
wrongdoing. The duty, when it exists, applies to specific groups of people, 
who, by the nature of their professional knowledge, may become aware of 
or suspect that certain crimes are being committed, and who might be 
expected to come across them during the course of their work. The scope of 
the duty is accordingly limited to crimes which are likely to be seen on the 
job, much as a physician must report gunshot wounds and child abuse seen 
in the ER, or as a publicly traded company’s external auditor must report 
certain errors in the client’s financial statements to the SEC. The witnessed 
wrongdoing encompasses financial crimes as well as physical harms. 
Requiring a CFO to speak, in the circumstances described in our 
hypothetical example, would be entirely consistent with these common 
aspects of the reporting statutes. 
                                                                                                                           
 
69 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(b)(2) (2012). 
70 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2012). 
71 See In re Himmel, 533 N.E.2d 790 (Ill. 1988) (lawyer suspended one year for failure to report 
his unprivileged knowledge of conversion of settlement funds by client’s prior lawyer). 
72 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101(b)(11) (2014). 
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C. Criminal Omissions 
In each of the examples discussed so far, a failure to act was wrongful 
because it was in violation of a duty to act. May one derive from these 
examples a general rule about the circumstances in which the law should 
impose a duty to act? 
Consider again the person in grave distress who perishes because no 
one else would help. It is this scenario which has driven the development of 
a general theory to explain where to draw the line between mere bystanders 
and those who should bear criminal responsibility for failing to act.73 
In a comprehensive study of criminal omissions, Professor Leavens 
summarizes several categories of cases in which the law imposes a duty to 
act, so that inaction is criminally punishable:74 
• Duty based on relationship, e.g., a parent’s duty to care for and 
protect their child.75 
• Duty based on contract, e.g., operator of boarding home is under a 
duty to feed and care for elderly patients.76 
                                                                                                                           
 
73 Leavens, A Causation Approach to Criminal Omissions, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 547, 553 (1988). 
74 Id. at 557–59. There are obvious similarities to the tort rules discussed above. The overlap is 
not surprising. Both tort and criminal law are concerned with the moral fault of the defendant (though 
both systems recognize strict liability in some cases). Darryl K. Brown, Criminal Law Theory and 
Criminal Justice Practice, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73, 75 (2012) (“[M]oral-based accounts have long 
informed our conceptualization of criminal law and punishment. A strictly deontological approach 
justifies punishment on grounds of the actor’s fault and culpability . . . .”). Culpability alone does not 
make conduct criminal, however; while there is much overlap between the two, not every tort, not even 
every intentional tort, is a crime. Just because a defendant should compensate a plaintiff does not mean 
that the defendant should also go to prison. “Other considerations must tip the balance between civil and 
criminal sanctions when the same culpable conduct is covered by both, and those factors are commonly 
prudential rather deontological.” Id. at 80. As well, criminal prosecution and punishment should 
accomplish something useful. “[F]or criminal punishment, the hoped-for result is typically crime 
reduction.” Id. at 74. The benefit of criminally punishing our hypothetical CFO is the same benefit 
sought by the whistleblower protection and bounty statutes; the encouragement of early disclosure in 
cases of financial statement fraud, thereby avoiding widespread loss. 
75 See, e.g., State v. Williquette, 385 N.W.2d 145 (Wis. 1986) (wife who knowingly permitted her 
husband to abuse their children guilty of the crime of child abuse because of the duty of a parent to 
protect their child). 
76 See, e.g., State v. Brown, 631 P.2d 129 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981), cited by Professor Leavens, the 
owner of a boarding home was under a criminally enforceable legal duty to ensure that her boarding 
home premises were safely operated and to see that her employees were able to and actually did provide 
necessary care. 
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• Duty based on ownership of premises to maintain premises in safe 
condition for lawful visitors. 
• Duty based on master-servant relationship to ensure that his or her 
servants do not injure others can, in appropriate circumstances, 
lead to criminal liability. 
• Duty arising from creation of peril.77 
• Duty arising from (other) voluntary assumption of care.78 
One of the categories involves the existence of a contractual duty to provide 
services. For example, “Where those services are closely related to 
protecting or caring for dependent persons, courts have imposed criminal 
liability when a failure to provide the services leads to a prohibited harm 
such as death.”79 One writer would generalize the rule and apply it where 
the prohibited harm is purely economic, such as in breach of a contract to 
provide CFO services.80 Other categories also seem analogous, such as the 
master’s duty to see that employees do not injure another, as well as the 
duty arising from the creation of a peril. Our hypothetical case might easily 
fit within more than one category. 
But not every breach of contract is or should be a crime, and 
categorization as a method has its limits. Professor Leavens suggests an 
alternative “proximate causation” approach. A person’s failure to act should 
give rise to criminal liability if there is a “valid expectation” that persons in 
similar circumstances would act to prevent a harm, and a “deeply ingrained 
common understanding that society relies on that individual to prevent the 
harm.”81 “Thus parents have a ‘duty’ to prevent harm to their children 
because empirically, almost all parents act this way, and normatively, our 
                                                                                                                           
 
77 See State v. Digennaro, 3 A.3d 1201 (Md. 2009). 
78 Other writers have identified other categories. For example the author of Criminal Omissions 
finds a duty to act in the following circumstances: 
1. Duty to aid anyone in peril, found in some European systems. 
2. Duty in a status relationship, e.g., parent child, spouse. 
3. Defendant’s exercise of a privilege to practice a calling or engage in a business or trade. 
4. Duty by participation in some permitted sphere of activity. 
5. Duty undertaken by contract 
Graham Hughes, Criminal Omissions, 67 YALE L.J. 590, 599–600 (1958). 
79 Leavens, supra note 73, at 558. 
80 Todd S. Aagaard, A Fresh Look at the Responsible Relation Doctrine, 96 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1245, 1281 (2006). 
81 Leavens, supra note 73, at 575. 
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society would consider it reprehensible if they did not.”82 Only those 
individuals whose failure to act is inconsistent with society’s expectation 
that they will prevent a particular harm can be said to cause that harm and 
should be criminally liable. Others who fail to act, however culpable from a 
moral standpoint, are merely observers, not causers, of the harm. 
Conclusion 
Holding our hypothetical CFO criminally responsible would be 
consistent with fundamental ideas about criminal culpability for one’s 
failure to act, and with what the law could and perhaps should be. As 
discussed in subsection A, above, a corporate officer may appropriately be 
held liable when the officer has knowledge of a wrong committed by 
another employee of and also, due to his position in the corporation, has the 
power to control it but fails to do so. In subsection B, above, we concluded 
that although members of the general public usually have no statutory or 
common law duty to report crime, many state impose a duty to report on 
members of a particular profession, who, in the course of their work, can be 
expected to encounter and recognize signs that certain crimes are being 
committed. We also found, in subsection C, above, that holding our 
hypothetical CFO criminally liable for his omission (his failure to correct 
the senior officer’s misrepresentation) would be consistent with accepted 
theories of criminal omission liability, of both the categorical and 
proximate cause varieties. 
Accordingly, we can make a strong case that our CFO should be held 
criminally liable for his failure to speak. The question, then, is whether a 
basis for criminal liability exists in current law. We turn now to the actual 
letter of the law applicable to our silent CFO. 
PART III: A CORPORATE OFFICER’S DUTY OF CANDOR 
A corporate officer, including our hypothetical CFO, owes a duty of 
candor to the corporation’s board of directors.83 The duty is related to the 
                                                                                                                           
 
82 Id. 
83 As well, 
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agency law principle that an agent must disclose to his principal material 
information relevant to the affairs of the agency entrusted to him. Notably, 
as set forth below, the officer owes no such duty to the shareholders. 
The explicit recognition of the duty is a fairly recent development. In 
discussing the financial scandals at the dawn of the new century, such as 
Enron, Professor Langevoort, in 2003, argued in favor recognizing an 
officer’s duty of candor to the board of directors, particularly a duty of the 
CEO to honestly tell the board what it needs to know to do its job. “I would 
venture a guess that in these scandals’ aftermath, courts will soon be 
tempted to address the duty of candor inside the corporation,”84 He noted 
the absence of case law and called the point an “empty space.”85 
He was joined by other commentators. One argued that “[s]enior 
corporate officers of public companies, CEOs and CFOs, owe directors and 
the corporation a duty to inform. . . .”86 She noted that the CEO and CFO 
are the two most senior officers, are required to sign Sarbanes Oxley 
certifications, and are subject to Delaware’s personal jurisdiction statute.87 
In 2007, Professor Johnson analyzed state corporation law concerning 
the duty owed by an officer to the corporation.88 In 16 states, there was 
common law only, the chief source being agency law. In 34 states, he found 
statutory and case law concerning an officer’s fiduciary duty and in 32 of 
those, the source of the statute was § 8.42 of the Model Business 
Corporation Act (“MBCA”). A 2005 amendment to § 8.42 added 
subsection (b), which imposes a disclosure obligation on officers. The 2005 
                                                                                                                           
 
a number of whistleblower statutes, both state and federal, include a “first report” 
requirement, wherein a whistleblower is required to “first report” the violation of law to 
the employer so as to provide an opportunity for the employer to cure the defect. Should 
the whistleblower fail to make this “first report,” he cannot invoke the protection of the 
whistleblower statute. 
See John B. Chiara & Michael D. Orenstein, Whistler’s Nocturne in Black and Gold—The Falling 
Rocket: Why the Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblower Provision Falls Short of the Mark, 23 HOFSTRA LAB. 
& EMP. L.J. 235, 252 n.128 (2005). 
84 Langevoort, supra note 8, at 1195. 
85 Id. at 1189. 
86 Z. Jill Barclift, Senior Corporate Officers and the Duty of Candor, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 269, 
270 (2006). 
87 Id. at 270 n.7. Nonresident senior officers of Delaware corporations consent to service of 
process in all civil actions brought in Delaware for violation of duty. DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 3114 (2009). 
88 Lyman Johnson, Having the Fiduciary Duty Talk: Model Advice for Corporate Officers (and 
Other Senior Agents), 63 BUS. LAW. 147 (2007). 
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amendment was intended to make explicit a duty that “implicit in, and 
embraced under, the broader” preexisting standard of good faith and due 
care.89 It has not yet been adopted by any state. Professor Johnson then gave 
“model fiduciary advice for officers,” including the following passage 
based on § 8.42 (b) of the MBCA: 
It is important for you to know that you must report certain matters to others in 
the company. This includes any business information within your sphere of 
responsibility that you know, or have reason to believe, to be either significant to 
the person to whom you report or that that person would wish to have, so that he 
or she can effectively perform his or her job. It also includes any information 
you have concerning actual or probable material violations of law, or breach of 
duty by any employee or agent of the company, that you believe has already 
occurred or is about to occur. Any such past or imminent violation of law or 
duty should be immediately reported to [specify]. Information, or a violation of 
law or duty, can be significant or material either because of the dollar amount 
involved or because of its serious nature.90 
Another commentator has also argued in favor recognizing an officer’s duty 
of candor to the board of directors.91 
The Delaware courts have also begun to address the point. We review 
Delaware case law, and then consider the Second and Third Restatements of 
Agency Law, and § 8.42(b) of the MBCA. 
Delaware 
In Mills Acquisition v. Macmillan, the Delaware Supreme Court stated 
the common sense principle that the CEO and COO of a public company 
may not deceive the board of directors in connection with a sale of the 
company.92 Maxwell and its rival KKR both sought control of Macmillan. 
The Macmillan board of directors delegated nearly all responsibility for 
dealings with Maxwell and KKR to its CEO and COO who, unbeknownst 
to the board, wished to acquire Macmillan in conjunction with KKR. 
Maxwell sought to enjoin an asset option agreement, a “lockup,” between 
                                                                                                                           
 
89 MBCA § 8.42 Official Comment, p. 8-85. 
90 Johnson, supra note 88, at 155 (emphasis added). 
91 Shannon German, What They Don’t Know Can’t Hurt Them: Corporate Officers’ Duty of 
Candor to Directors, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 221 (2009). 
92 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989). 
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Macmillan and KKR, which the Macmillan board had approved after KKR 
was the high bidder in an auction which the CEO and COO had rigged in 
favor of KKR. 
The CEO and COO manipulated the Macmillan board to favor KKR’s 
bid by giving the board a selective and skewed presentation of the facts. 
They also improperly favored KKR in the auction, wrongfully providing 
KKR a “tip” as to Maxwell’s bid. Macmillan’s board was uninformed as to 
such clandestine advantages. “Their silence was misleading and deceptive. 
In short, it was a fraud upon the board.”93 An officer may not withhold 
material information in order to deceive the board and gain personal 
advantage. 
The Delaware Supreme Court again addressed the duties of an officer 
in Gantler v. Stephens Shareholders of First Niles Financial, Inc. sued 
officers and directors of First Niles for violating their fiduciary duties by 
rejecting a valuable opportunity to sell the company, by deciding instead to 
reclassify the company’s shares in order to benefit themselves, and by 
disseminating a materially misleading proxy statement to induce 
shareholder approval.94 The Delaware Supreme Court concluded that the 
complaint pleaded sufficient facts to overcome the business judgment rule, 
and to state substantive fiduciary duty and disclosure claims. 
The key language for our purposes is this passage: 
The Court of Chancery has held, and the parties do not dispute, that corporate 
officers owe fiduciary duties that are identical to those owed by corporate 
directors. That issue—whether or not officers owe fiduciary duties identical to 
those of directors—has been characterized as a matter of first impression for this 
Court. In the past, we have implied that officers of Delaware corporations, like 
directors, owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty, and that the fiduciary duties 
of officers are the same as those of directors. We now explicitly so hold.95 
The duties may be in a general sense identical, but officers and the board of 
directors perform different functions and communicate to different 
audiences. “In the absence of a request for stockholder action, the Delaware 
General Corporation Law does not require directors to provide shareholders 
                                                                                                                           
 
93 Id. at 1283. 
94 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009). 
95 Id. at 708–09 (emphasis added). 
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with information concerning the finances or affairs of the corporation.”96 In 
contrast, the corporation’s executive officers should be reporting regularly 
to the board in order for the board to be able to do its job.97 Though it is an 
imperfect analogy, it may serve well enough. 
Because the duties of officers are arguably analogous to those of 
directors, we consider the duties of the board of directors when it 
communicates with shareholders in hope of illuminating the disclosure 
obligations of corporate officers like our hypothetical CFO. 
Malone, Pfeffer, and Omissions 
The complaint in Malone v. Brincat, alleged that the directors 
intentionally overstated the financial condition of Mercury, a publicly 
traded company, on repeated occasions throughout a four-year period in 
disclosures to Mercury’s shareholders.98 Did Mercury’s directors breach 
their fiduciary duty of loyalty and good faith by knowingly disseminating to 
the stockholders false information about the financial condition of the 
company? 
“When directors communicate publicly or directly with shareholders 
about corporate matters the sine qua non of directors’ fiduciary duty to 
shareholders is honesty,” wrote the court.99 Directors who knowingly 
disseminate false information “violate their fiduciary duty, and may be held 
accountable in a manner appropriate to the circumstances.”100 The point 
would seem to apply with equal ease to an officer. 
The Malone court organized director communications into three 
categories:101 
• Public statements made to the market, including shareholders. 
The court noted that it has not recognized a state common law 
                                                                                                                           
 
96 Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 11 (Del. 1998). 
97 See generally Smith v. Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (directors must exercise an 
informed business judgment). See also MBCA § 8.42 Official Comment: “Subsection (b)(1) addresses 
the flow of information to the board of directors and to superior officers necessary to enable them to 
perform their decision-making and oversight functions. See the Official Comment to section 8.31.” 
98 722 A.2d 5 (Del. 1998). 
99 Id. at 10. 
100 Id. at 9. 
101 Id. at 11. 
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cause of action against the directors of Delaware corporations for 
“fraud on the market.” 
• Statements informing shareholders about the affairs of the 
corporation without a request for shareholder action. When the 
directors disseminate information to stockholders when no 
stockholder action is sought, the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty 
and good faith apply. Dissemination of false information could 
violate one or more of those duties. 
• Statements to shareholders in conjunction with a request for 
shareholder action. There is a duty to disclose all material facts 
when seeking stockholder action. This duty of disclosure is a 
specific application of the general fiduciary duty owed by 
directors; it obligates directors to provide the stockholders with 
accurate and complete information material to a transaction or 
other corporate event that is being presented to them for action. 
The dissemination of inaccurate information may be the result of 
carelessness or calculation.102 It is the latter which can lead to meaningful 
personal liability for the members of the breaching board.103 
The board’s duty of disclosure was also discussed in Pfeffer v. 
Redstone.104 Pfeffer brought a class action against the directors of Viacom 
and Blockbuster. Viacom spun-off its controlling interest in Blockbuster. 
Two transactions were challenged: (1) a special $5 dividend paid to 
Blockbuster stockholders (the “Special Dividend”); and, (2) a later offer to 
Viacom stockholders to exchange their Viacom stock for Blockbuster stock 
(the “Exchange Offer”). 
Pfeffer claimed that the Viacom board of directors violated their duty 
of disclosure—the third of Malone’s categories—in relation to the 
Exchange Offer. Specifically, Pfeffer alleged that the Viacom directors 
                                                                                                                           
 
102 Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d at 11. 
103 See In re Tyson Foods, Inc. Consol S’holder Litig., 919 A.2d 563, 597–98 (Del. Ch. 2007) 
(“Disclosure violations may, but do not always, involve violations of the duty of loyalty. A decision 
violates only the duty of care when the misstatement or omission was made as a result of a director’s 
erroneous judgment with regard to the proper scope and content of disclosure, but was nevertheless 
made in good faith. Conversely, where there is reason to believe that the board lacked good faith in 
approving a disclosure, the violation implicates the duty of loyalty.”). Since care violations are waived 
in the corporate charter, are indemnified by the corporation, and subject to review under the lenient 
business judgment rule, only a breach of loyalty or good faith has teeth. 
104 965 A.2d 676 (Del. 2009). 
2014]      WHEN MINDING YOUR OWN BUSINESS MEANS SPEAKING UP 283 
 
Vol. 32, No. 2 (2014) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2014.66 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
failed to disclose the true state of Blockbusters’ operational cash flow. A 
Blockbuster treasury department manager had compiled a cash flow 
analysis seven months before the Exchange Offer which showed that 
Blockbuster’s operational cash flow could not support the Special Dividend 
or Exchange Offer. The court recognized that corporate fiduciaries can 
breach their duty of disclosure under Delaware law by omitting to state a 
material fact, but dismissed Pfeffer’s claim because there was no showing 
that the Viacom directors knew or should have known of the omitted facts. 
Pfeffer stands for the proposition that a calculated, knowing omission is a 
breach of the duty of disclosure. 
Having considered the pronouncements of the Delaware Supreme 
Court, we turn to two recent cases decided by the Court of Chancery 
concerning an officer’s duty to disclose. An officer’s duty to disclose 
information to the board was at issue in Hampshire Group v. Kuttner.105 
The former Hampshire Group CFO and Chief Accounting Officer, Clayton 
and Clark, were sued by Hampshire Group, which claimed, inter alia, that 
they had violated their fiduciary duties in carrying out an assignment to 
process and bring up to date former CEO Kuttner’s lavish expense reports, 
which had not been filed for many years. 
The court gave an overview of the basic fiduciary standard that 
governed Hampshire’s claims. As officers, both Clayton and Clark owed 
certain fiduciary duties to Hampshire: 
Like directors, officers also have other contextual obligations as fiduciaries. 
These include the responsibility to disclose to their superior officer or principal 
“material information relevant to the affairs of the agency entrusted to them.” 
Liability for a failure in this regard, however, must be examined under the 
standards just outlined, to determine whether any failure in information sharing 
was the product of gross negligence or disloyalty.106 
                                                                                                                           
 
105 Hampshire Group, Ltd. v. Kuttner, 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 144 (July 12, 2010). 
106 Id. at 13 n.85. With respect to the duty to disclose material information, the Hampshire Group 
court provided the following additional citations: see Science Accessories Corp. v. Summagraphics 
Corp., 425 A.2d 957, 962 (Del. 1980) (“Encompassed within such general duties of an agent is a duty to 
disclose information that is relevant to the affairs of the agency entrusted to him.”); 2 MODEL BUS. 
CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.42(b)(1) (4th ed. 2009) (“The duty of an officer includes the obligation to inform 
the superior officer to whom, or the board of directors or the committee thereof to which, the officer 
reports of information about the affairs of the corporation known to the officer, within the scope of the 
officer’s functions, and known to the officer to be material to such superior officer, board, or committee 
. . . .”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 381 (1958) (“Unless otherwise agreed, an agent 
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The court found Clayton and Clark not liable for any excessive 
reimbursements to Kuttner. There was no evidence of a lack of good faith 
on their part in carrying out the expense project, and thus no violation of the 
duty of loyalty. They were required to process expenses for many years 
under a tight deadline, and, applying a gross negligence standard, the court 
found that the executives had not been grossly negligent and therefore had 
not violated their duty of care. 
Notably, Hampshire contended that it was a breach of fiduciary duty 
for Clayton and Clark not to inform the Audit Committee of the difficulties 
in the review process. But, the Audit Committee knew that Kuttner’s 
expense reports would be imperfect, and there was no breach in failing to 
tell the board what its members already knew.107 
Reading Mills Acquisition, Gantler, Pfeffer, Malone and Hampshire 
Group together, it is clear that an officer of a Delaware corporation may not 
mislead the board by failing to reveal facts known to the officer but not 
known to the board, and which are material to the board. 
The most recent Delaware case is also the only case that directly 
addresses the duty of a corporate officer to disclose material facts to a 
stockholder. In re Wayport involved insider trading in a face-to-face 
transaction.108 The plaintiffs sued for damages arising out of their sales of 
stock in Wayport, Inc. to corporate insiders. They asserted both breach of 
fiduciary duty and fraud causes of action, alleging that the insider 
purchasers had failed to disclose certain facts to the sellers. The court relied 
on the Delaware’s “special facts doctrine,” which applies when a corporate 
                                                                                                                           
 
is subject to a duty to use reasonable efforts to give his principal information which is relevant to affairs 
entrusted to him and which, as the agent has notice, the principal would desire to have and which can be 
communicated without violating a superior duty to a third person.”); A. Gilchrist Sparks, III & 
Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Common Law Duties of Non-Director Corporate Officers, 48 BUS. LAW. 
226–29 (describing the corporate officers’ duty to keep the board of directors informed).” 
107 The Hampshire Group court cited Science Accessories Corp. v. Summagraphics Corp., 425 
A.2d 957 (Del. 1980). In that case, SAC, a corporate employer sought equitable relief against former 
employees for alleged breach of fiduciary and contractual duties with respect to an alleged corporate 
opportunity. The chancery court held against the employer. Affirming, the Delaware Supreme Court 
noted that “under elemental principles of agency law, an agent owes his principal a duty of good faith, 
loyalty, and fair dealing. 3 CJS Agency § 271; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (1957). 
Encompassed within such general duties of an agent is a duty to disclose information that is relevant to 
the affairs of the agency entrusted to him.” Id. at 962, citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY 
§ 381. 
108 In re Wayport, Inc. Litig., 76 A.3d 296 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
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fiduciary buys shares directly from or sells shares directly to an existing 
stockholder. Under that doctrine, the fiduciary has a duty of disclosure only 
when he has an insider’s knowledge of important transactions such as 
prospective mergers, probable sales of the entire assets or business, 
agreements with third parties to buy large blocks of stock at a high price, 
and impending declarations of unusual dividends.109 The Wayport court 
dismissed the claims, finding that the defendants knew no special facts. 
Wayport and the special facts doctrine have no direct application to the 
conduct of our hypothetical CFO who is neither a buyer nor a seller of his 
corporation’s stock. The duties imposed by the special facts doctrine do not 
exist in connection with purchases or sales made in the public markets. 
In summary, Delaware case law provides a general foundation for 
finding that an officer is duty bound to report to the board or to the audit 
committee violations of law or other wrongs known to the officer but not to 
the board, if material to the board’s ability to perform its functions. 
However, it provides no basis for concluding that an officer owes a duty of 
disclosure to the stockholders, except when the officer is involved in a face-
to-face purchase or sale of the corporation’s stock which implicates the 
special facts doctrine. 
Beyond Delaware 
Nearly all the commentators, as well as the Delaware Court of 
Chancery in Hampshire Group, cite the Restatement (Second) of Agency. 
Johnson’s article cited the Restatement (Third) of Agency. There is little 
difference between the two formulations, and while both certainly support 
the duty of a corporate officer to disclose material information to his 
“principal,” both are general in terms and neither specifically addresses the 
duty. In both, the duty of the agent is to use reasonable efforts to give or 
provide the principal with facts or information relevant to the agent’s duties 
(or to the affairs entrusted to him) and which the agent has notice (or knows 
                                                                                                                           
 
109 See Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 435 (7th Cir. 1987) (“The ‘special facts’ 
doctrine developed by several courts at the turn of the century is based on the principle that insiders in 
closely held firms may not buy stock from outsiders in person-to-person transactions without informing 
them of new events that substantially affect the value of the stock. See, e.g., Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 
419, 433–34 (1909).”). 
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or should know) that the principal would wish (or desire) to have.110 Given 
their generality, neither specifies whether a corporate officer’s principal 
would be the board, the corporation, or the stockholders. 
Beyond the Common Law 
In contrast to the generality of the Restatements, which after all 
concern the broader topic of agency, the Model Business Corporation Act 
specifically addresses the duties of a corporate officer, and, as predicted by 
Professor Langevoort, was amended in 2005 in response to Enron.111 
Section 8.42(b)(1) concerns the duty of an officer to provide 
information about corporate affairs, much as the Restatements require of an 
agent. But unlike the Restatements, § 8.42(b)(2) of the MBCA specifically 
requires an officer to report “up the chain” violations of law and breaches 
of duty. 
8.42 Standards of Conduct for Officers 
(b) The duty of an officer includes the obligation: 
(1) to inform the superior officer to whom, or the board of directors or the 
committee thereof to which, the officer reports of information about the affairs 
of the corporation known to the officer, within the scope of the officer’s 
                                                                                                                           
 
110 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 381 (1958) 
 Duty to Give Information 
Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is subject to a duty to use reasonable 
efforts to give his principal information which is relevant to affairs entrusted 
to him and which, as the agent has notice, the principal would desire to have 
and which can be communicated without violating a superior duty to a third 
person. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.11 (2006) 
 Duty to Provide Information 
An agent has a duty to use reasonable effort to provide the principal with 
facts that the agent knows, has reason to know, or should know when 
(1) subject to any manifestation by the principal, the agent knows or has 
reason to know that the principal would wish to have the facts or the facts are 
material to the agent’s duties to the principal; and 
(2) the facts can be provided to the principal without violating a superior duty 
owed by the agent to another person. 
111 R. Franklin Balotti & Megan W. Shaner, Safe Harbor for Officer Reliance: Comparing the 
Approaches of the Model Business Corporation Act and Delaware’s General Corporation Law, 74 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 161, 163 (Winter 2011). 
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functions, and known to the officer to be material to such superior officer, board 
or committee; and 
(2) to inform his or her superior officer, or another appropriate person within the 
corporation, or the board of directors, or a committee thereof, of any actual or 
probable material violation of law involving the corporation or material breach 
of duty to the corporation by an officer, employee, or agent of the corporation, 
that the officer believes has occurred or is likely to occur. 
The Official Comment to § 8.42 explains that “the common law, including 
the law of agency, has recognized a duty on the part of officers and key 
employees to disclose to their superiors material information relevant to the 
affairs of the agency entrusted to them.”112 Subsection (b)(2) states this 
disclosure obligation by confirming that the officer must: 
inform the relevant superior authority, or other appropriate person within the 
corporation of violations of law or breaches of duty that the officer believes have 
occurred or are about to occur (i.e., more likely than not to occur) and are or 
would be material to the corporation. 
As with Delaware law, the officer is supposed to tell the board, or, since 
many codes of conduct establish a system for reporting violations of law, 
officers may make report to the ethics officer, internal auditor, general 
counsel or the like.113 However, subsection (b)(2) imposes no duty to 
inform the stockholders of the corporation. 
Conclusion 
The corporate officer’s duty of candor is owed to the board. Nothing in 
Delaware law, the Restatement or the MBCA, suggests that a corporate 
officer—even a CFO—is under a duty to circumvent internal reporting 
procedures and speak directly to the stockholders. The only cases which 
found that an officer has a fiduciary duty to disclose to a stockholder 
involved stock transactions directly with the stockholder. Yet, our CFO 
may still be liable under Rule 10b-5 based on his failure to disclose to the 
board. As developed below, even if the fraud is against the board, it can still 
be “in connection with” stock market purchases and sales of the 
corporation’s stock for purposes of Rule 10b-5. 
                                                                                                                           
 
112 MBCA § 8.42 Official Comment, p. 8-351. 
113 Id. 
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It seems likely that our hypothetical CFO should have reported the 
misstatement immediately to the audit committee of the board, given his 
seniority, the magnitude of the matter, and the requirement of § 302 of the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act, discussed above, that CFO certify that he has 
disclosed to the audit committee any fraud he knows about which involves 
management.114 Had he done so, he would have discharged his duty under 
state law, and, as we shall see, would face no prospect of liability under 
Rule 10b-5.115 Had he contradicted his colleague during the call, that act 
alone, while commendable, would not have discharged his duty to the 
board. The incident would require a report to the board. 
PART IV 
In Part III, we determined that our CFO owes a duty of disclosure to 
the board but not to the stockholders. To determine whether the CFO may 
be held criminally liable for violation of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, we must 
consider whether an officer’s silence, in breach of a fiduciary duty to 
disclose, can constitute a violation of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5? In this part, 
we address that issue. 
Silence, in Breach of Fiduciary Duty, as a Violation of § 10(b) and 
Rule10b-5 
When is silence a fraud in breach of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5? 
§ 10(b) of the Exchange Act states, 
It shall be unlawful for any person . . . 
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . 
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such 
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or 
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors. 
Rule 10b-5 states, 
It shall be unlawful for any person . . . 
                                                                                                                           
 
114 See also Hampshire Group v. Kuttner, 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 144 (July 12, 2010) (discussing 
disclosure to the board). 
115 See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
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(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material 
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or 
sale of any security. 
The subsections of Rule 10b-5 are in the disjunctive and violation of any 
one of them is sufficient to violate the Rule. 
In an SEC enforcement action under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the SEC 
must prove that in connection with the purchase or sale of a security the 
defendant, acting with scienter, made a material misrepresentation (or a 
material omission if the defendant had a duty to speak) or used a fraudulent 
device. In order to impose criminal liability, the government must also 
prove that the defendant willfully violated the law. Neither the SEC nor the 
prosecutor need prove reliance. The government, as opposed to a private 
plaintiff, need prove only materiality, meaning that there is a substantial 
likelihood that a reasonable investor would find the omission or 
misrepresentation important in making an investment decision, and not that 
a victim did, in fact, rely on it.116 
We consider three Supreme Court decisions, Affiliated Ute Citizens of 
Utah v. United States,117 Chiarella v. United States,118 and United States v. 
O’Hagan,119 and recent appeals court opinions involving enforcement 
actions brought by the SEC and the Department of Justice, which applied 
Rule 10b-5 to punish fiduciary silence in cases that did not involve insider 
trading.120 We also consider a district court opinion that recognized a silent 
CFO’s duty to speak. 
                                                                                                                           
 
116 United States v. Vilar, 729 F.3d 62, 75 (2d Cir. 2013). 
117 Affiliated UTE Citizens of UT v. United States, 406 U.S. 89 (1972). 
118 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 219 (1980). 
119 United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
120 There are other duties to disclose, for which breach is also a violation of section 10(b), such as 
a duty to correct one’s own prior statement believed to be true when made, if it is revealed that those 
statements were in fact inaccurate when made and those statements would be materially misleading 
absent correction. See In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1430–31 (3d Cir. 1997); 
Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 910 F.2d 10, 16–17 (1st Cir. 1990) (en banc). There may also be a duty to 
update statements that were accurate when made, if those statements no longer reflect the true facts and 
would be materially misleading absent updating. Id. But see Stransky v. Cummings Engine Co., 51 F.3d 
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The key rule for our purposes was stated by the court in Chiarella: 
silence in connection with the purchase or sale of securities may operate as a 
fraud actionable under § 10(b) despite the absence of statutory language or 
legislative history specifically addressing the legality of nondisclosure. But such 
liability is premised upon a duty to disclose arising from a relationship of trust 
and confidence between parties to a transaction.121 
The Court based this understanding of the statute upon the common 
law rule that, 
one who fails to disclose material information prior to the consummation of a 
transaction commits fraud only when he is under a duty to do so. And the duty to 
disclose arises when one party has information that the other party is entitled to 
know because of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence 
between them.122 
The Court’s reference to a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and 
confidence as the basis of a duty to disclose suggests two questions: First, 
might there be a relationship of trust and confidence between the CFO and 
the stockholders that derives from federal law and which imposes a duty to 
speak in the circumstances of our hypothetical? In the alternative, if our 
hypothetical CFO’s silence were in breach of a duty to disclose arising from 
the relationship of trust and confidence between the CFO and the board of 
directors of a publicly traded corporation, might that silence also constitute 
a breach of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 if it is in connection with the purchase 
and sale of the corporation’s stock? 
The first question may be simpler to answer. The federal relationship 
of trust and confidence between an officer and shareholders has been found 
only in insider trading cases. A “corporate insider,” while in possession of 
material non-public information, must either disclose that information or 
abstain from trading in the corporation’s securities.123 The Chiarella Court 
explained the basis for the duty to disclose. “In its Cady, Roberts decision, 
                                                                                                                           
 
1329 (7th Cir. 1995); Gallagher v. Abbott Laboratories, 269 F.3d 806, 810 (7th Cir. 2001) (no duty to 
update). Moreover, the express language of Rule 10b-5(b) incorporates the half-truth rule (to omit to 
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances 
under which they were made, not misleading). See Donald C. Langevoort & G. Mitu Gulati, The 
Muddled Duty to Disclose Under Rule 10b-5, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1639, 1664–71 (2004). 
121 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230. 
122 Id. at 228. 
123 Id. at 227. 
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the [Securities and Exchange] Commission recognized a relationship of 
trust and confidence between the shareholders of a corporation and those 
insiders who have obtained confidential information by reason of their 
position with that corporation.”124 If the trades are made in a face-to-face 
transaction, then presumably the disclosure must be made to the 
counterpart, much as with the common law special facts doctrine. If the 
trades are made via a market transaction, then disclosure must be made to 
the public.125 
One way of understanding the rule is to imagine the insider standing 
face to face with every stockholder and every prospective buyer in the 
market. If the insider buys from or sells to any of them (even if this is their 
first purchase of the stock and they are not currently stockholders to whom 
he owes a common law fiduciary duty), he must disclose the material non-
public information to his counterpart. Unlike the common law “special 
facts” rule, which benefits only current stockholders who enter into face to 
face transactions with insiders, this duty extends to prospective 
stockholders purchasing in the market when the insider is selling. In this 
context at least, when the insider is buying or selling, there is a federal 
relationship of trust and confidence between the insider and his 
counterparts.126 The Court reiterated the point in O’Hagan: 
Under the “traditional” or “classical theory” of insider trading liability, § 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5 are violated when a corporate insider trades in the securities of 
his corporation on the basis of material, nonpublic information. Trading on such 
information qualifies as a “deceptive device” under § 10(b), we have affirmed, 
because “a relationship of trust and confidence [exists] between the shareholders 
of a corporation and those insiders who have obtained confidential information 
by reason of their position with that corporation.” Chiarella v. United States . . . 
That relationship, we recognized, “gives rise to a duty to disclose [or to abstain 
from trading] . . . .”127 
Such a duty was urged by the government in Schiff, a case not 
involving insider trading. Such a duty, had it existed, would have been 
                                                                                                                           
 
124 Id. at 228. 
125 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc). Of course, the 
disclosure cannot be made in most cases; the trader has no authority to do so, and must abstain. 
126 If our hypothetical CFO were himself trading at the time of the analyst call, then he is an 
insider trader and the case against him becomes simple. 
127 O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 651–52. 
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consistent with the special responsibility of the CFO of a publicly traded 
corporation, as discussed above. Unfortunately, and contrary to the 
government’s contention in Schiff that high corporate officers “have a 
fiduciary duty to shareholders under both federal and Delaware law that can 
give rise to a duty of disclosure,”128 corporate officers have been found to 
owe a duty of candor to public stockholders and to the stock market as a 
whole, only in insider trading cases. This is consistent with the usual 
corporate model of up-the-chain reporting of wrongdoing, as expressed in 
§ 8.42(b) of the MBCA. The officer speaks to the board, and the board to 
the stockholders. 
We must turn then to the second question, which is more difficult to 
answer. If our hypothetical CFO’s silence were in breach of his fiduciary 
duty to disclose owed to the board, might that silence also constitute a 
breach of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 if it is “in connection with” the purchase 
and sale of the corporation’s stock? That argument was not made, and the 
Third Circuit did not address it, in Schiff. Probably that court would have 
rejected the argument, given the court’s narrow view of the duty to disclose 
in Rule 10b-5 cases. The Schiff court held that that a duty to disclose under 
Rule 10b-5 may arise in three circumstances, the first being “when there is 
. . . insider trading. . . .”129 (The other two circumstances involve a statute 
requiring disclosure and the duty to correct one’s own misstatement, and 
have no bearing on our hypothetical case or the facts in Schiff.) The Third 
Circuit was not willing to consider other instances of wrongful fiduciary 
silence as violations. 
Other courts have and have found that silence can violate § 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 even where insider trading is not alleged. The wrongful silence 
rule traces back to a case that did not involve insider trading. The defendant 
stock buyers in Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States had no 
special knowledge about the affairs of the issuer, yet their silence violated 
§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.130 
                                                                                                                           
 
128 Reply Brief for Appellant, the United States of America, United States v. Schiff, 602 F.3d 152 
(3d Cir. 2010). Nos. 08-1909, 08-1903, at 14 (Mar. 31, 2009). 
129 Schiff, 602 F.3d at 162. 
130 Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah is one of its foundations of insider trading law, cited by the 
Court in Chiarella in support of the proposition that “silence in connection with the purchase or sale of 
securities may operate as a fraud actionable under § 10(b).” Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230. 
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Pursuant to federal statute, the Ute Distribution Corp. (“UDC”) held 
the natural resources belonging to the mixed blood members of an Indian 
tribe. UDC appointed First Security Bank of Utah to be UDC’s stock 
transfer agent, the bank to hold the stock certificates and issue receipts to 
the mixed blood shareholders. UDC’s board advised the bank “to 
discourage the sale of stock of the Ute Distribution Corporation by any of 
its stockholders and to emphasize and stress to the said stockholders the 
importance of retaining said stock.” 
In fact, there was a small shares market, effectively controlled by the 
bank. Gale and Haslem were assistant managers at the bank’s branch office 
in Roosevelt, Utah, where many mixed bloods lived. They actively 
promoted a market for the UDC stock among whites. 
Some members sold their UDC shares to nonmembers, including Gale 
and Haslem. The mixed-blood sellers considered the two to be familiar with 
the market for the shares, and relied upon them when they desired to sell 
their shares. The complaint alleged that the two devised a scheme to acquire 
shares in UDC for themselves and others for less than fair value. 
The Court concluded that, in the circumstances, the two should have 
disclosed to the sellers material facts that reasonably could have been 
expected to influence their decision to sell, including that UDC shares were 
selling for a higher price in the non-Indian market. Notably, the Court 
indicated that the defendants might be liable under Rule 10b-5(a) or 10b-
5(c) even if they had not made any untrue statements as required by Rule 
10b-5(b): 
[T]he Court of Appeals erred when it held that there was no violation of the Rule 
unless the record disclosed evidence of reliance on material fact 
misrepresentations by Gale and Haslem. We do not read Rule 10b-5 so 
restrictively. To be sure, the second subparagraph of the rule specifies the 
making of an untrue statement of a material fact and the omission to state a 
material fact. The first and third subparagraphs are not so restricted. These 
defendants’ activities, outlined above, disclose, within the very language of one 
or the other of those sub-paragraphs, a “course of business” or a “device, 
scheme, or artifice” that operated as a fraud upon the Indian sellers.131 
                                                                                                                           
 
131 Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 152–53 (internal citation omitted). 
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The Court explained, as well, that the materiality of the omitted fact 
establishes the causal connection between the defendant’s silence and the 
harm suffered. 
Under the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a failure to disclose, 
positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery. All that is necessary is 
that the facts withheld be material in the sense that a reasonable investor might 
have considered them important in the making of this decision. This obligation 
to disclose, and this withholding of a material fact, establish the requisite 
element of causation in fact.132 
Applying the teaching of Affiliated Ute, The Second, Ninth and Tenth 
Circuits have applied Rule 10b-5 to fiduciary silence cases that did not 
involve insider trading. 
SEC v. Cochran133 
Cochran was Executive Vice President of a municipal bond 
underwriting firm called Stifel. He advised governmental agencies 
regarding their issuance of bonds and the interim reinvestment of the 
proceeds. Cochran acted not merely as an underwriter but also as the 
agencies’ advisor and agent during the reinvestment phase. In one 
transaction, he solicited bids for a certain forward transaction and selected 
Sakura Global Capital, Inc. as the winning bidder. There was evidence that 
Sakura’s success was a foregone conclusion because Cochran rigged the 
bidding. Undisclosed to the client, the Oklahoma Turnpike Authority, 
Sakura paid Stifel $6.593 million in relation to the transaction. 
Citing Chiarella, the Cochran court wrote that “[a] failure to disclose 
is actionable as fraud under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
only if one party has information ‘that the other party is entitled to know 
because of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence 
between them.’”134 As there was some evidence that Cochran had a 
fiduciary relationship with the OTA, the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment was reversed. 
                                                                                                                           
 
132 Id. at 153–54 (internal citations omitted). 
133 SEC v. Cochran, 214 F.3d 1261 (10th Cir. 2000). 
134 Id. at 1264. 
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SEC v. DiBella135 
The Connecticut State Treasurer, who managed the Connecticut 
Retirement and Trust Funds, failed to disclose to his overseer, the 
Investment Advisory Council, that in connection with his investment of $75 
million in Fund money with a firm called Thayer, a bogus “finder fee” of 
$374,500 was paid by Thayer to an associate of the State Treasurer. The 
State Treasurer was a fiduciary of the Fund; he should have disclosed 
“material omissions at least to the IAC.”136 The court held that the failure of 
a fiduciary to disclose such material information constituted a violation of 
Rule 10b-5.137 The court did not specify which subsection of the Rule 
applied. 
United States v. Laurienti138 
Senior brokers of a securities broker-dealer firm engaged in a “pump 
and dump” scheme and, to that end, were paid massive commissions by the 
firm if a client purchased a targeted house stock. The bonus commissions 
were not disclosed to the clients. The court discussed Chiarella, concluding 
that “a party has a duty to disclose material ‘inside information’ to another 
party only if there is a fiduciary or other similar relationship of trust and 
confidence between the parties. . . .”139 “Although Chiarella concerned the 
use of ‘inside information,’ the foundation for the Supreme Court’s rule 
was . . . the rule that persons in trust relationships have greater duties to 
each other than do persons involved in arms-length transactions.” The court 
could think of no reason “why the general Chiarella rule should not apply 
here.”140 
The court also suggested that subsections (a) and (c) of Rule 10b-5 
apply when the defendant makes no statements; subsection (b) applies when 
the defendant makes a material misstatement or a material half-truth.141 
                                                                                                                           
 
135 SEC v. Dibella, 587 F.3d 553 (2d Cir. 2009). 
136 Id. at 565. 
137 Id. at 566. 
138 611 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 2010). 
139 Id. at 539. 
140 Id. at 540. 
141 Id. at 541. 
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This observation is consistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Affiliated Ute, and its relevance will become clear when we consider the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Janus Capital Group v. First Deriv. 
Traders,142 below. A fourth case, United States v. Wolfson,143 is on all fours 
with Laurienti. 
As the foregoing cases indicate, true to Affiliated Ute, the courts of 
appeal for the Second, Ninth and Tenth Circuits have held in cases not 
involving insider trading that a fiduciary’s wrongful silence violates Rule 
10b-5. 
A fifth case, from the First Circuit, involved facts similar to those in 
our hypothetical. In SEC v. Papa,144 the SEC argued that senior executives 
of a fiduciary trust company owed a duty to tell the client that the fiduciary 
trust company had mismanaged the client’s assets and then engaged in a 
cover-up. Their wrongful silence allegedly violated Rule 10b-5. Putnam 
Fiduciary Trust Co. (“PFTC”), an administrator of employee defined 
contribution plans, was responsible for investing the client’s assets. It 
waited a day longer to do so than it should have. PFTC did not make the 
investments until January 3, 2001, causing the client’s plan to miss a sharp 
upswing in the markets. Had the same funds been invested on January 2, 
the value of the holdings of the plan would have been almost $4 million 
greater. 
Six officers of PFTC met on January 5, 2001. They agreed to conceal 
the error by using “as-of” transactions—backdated purchases that used the 
price from an earlier day rather than the price current on the date the 
transaction occurred. Such as-of trades can dilute the value of other shares 
in a mutual fund. The as-of transactions generated about $3 million for the 
client’s plan at the expense of the other mutual fund shareholders. The 
remaining one million in loses went uncompensated. 
The court of appeals was concerned with only three of the six officers. 
It was not concerned with the most senior officer of the six, described as 
“the highest ranking executive of PFTC,” who gave the order to execute the 
scheme, nor with two others who carried out the pertinent transactions. 
However, the district court had dismissed the SEC’s complaint against the 
                                                                                                                           
 
142 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011). 
143 642 F.3d 293 (2d Cir. 2011). 
144 555 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 2009). 
2014]      WHEN MINDING YOUR OWN BUSINESS MEANS SPEAKING UP 297 
 
Vol. 32, No. 2 (2014) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2014.66 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
three others: one a senior officer who reported to the highest ranking 
executive; the other two, unit heads (“the three”). 
The three were present when the scheme was proposed and agreed to 
on January 5, 2001. One and two years later, in January 2002, and February 
2003, they had signed letters stating that they were unaware of any frauds 
or illegal acts, despite knowing that the as-of transactions and accounting 
adjustments had occurred and not been disclosed.145 
The SEC made no claim based directly on the three officers’ 
agreement at the January 5, 2001, meeting. The court of appeals remarked 
“Where a wrongful act is proposed, there is some precedent for treating as 
aiding and abetting a bystander’s assurance that no repercussions will 
follow.”146 Nonetheless, the SEC did not make this argument, and the court 
of appeals expressly did not consider it. Nor was PFTC named as a 
defendant in the SEC’s Complaint. 
Instead, the SEC’s complaint alleged that PFTC and the six individual 
defendants failed to disclose to the client: (a) the one-day delay in investing 
its assets; (b) that the client was only partially compensated for the missed 
opportunity arising from the delay; and (c) that the client was partially 
compensated at the expense of Putnam mutual funds in violation of PFTC 
policy.147 
In the district court, the SEC contended that PFTC had fiduciary duties 
to the client arising out of its status as agent for the client and as trustee of a 
trust consisting of the assets that the client transferred to it.148 These duties 
required PFTC to disclose the truth to the client. The SEC also contended 
that all six individuals breached a duty to disclose the truth to the client, and 
that their silence violated Rule 10b-5. In its trial brief, the SEC argued: 
[B]ecause each defendant was an employee—and most, senior executives—of 
PFTC, each defendant shared in PFTC’s duties with respect to the [client], 
including duties of disclosure of material facts. . . . A failure to disclose is 
actionable under the antifraud provisions if “one party has information that the 
                                                                                                                           
 
145 As part of an audit of internal controls for the years 2001 and 2002, certain senior managers 
were required to sign statements that they were “unaware of any uncorrected errors, frauds or illegal acts 
attributable to” PFTC that had affected its clients. Id. at 34. 
146 Id. at 38. 
147 Complaint at 1–2, 12, 14, 17, SEC v. Papa, 2005 WL 3776465 (D. Mass. 2005) (No. 05 CA 
12618 NMG). 
148 Id. at 7–8. 
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other [party] is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other similar 
relationship of trust and confidence between them.” . . . “Because the Complaint 
alleges that none of the defendants disclosed the truth to the [client] . . . the 
Complaint states a claim for an actionable omission in light of the defendants’ 
duties under state law.”149 
Although the First Circuit does recognize that “[a] breach of fiduciary 
duty can sometimes be central to a § 10(b) violation”150 the district court 
dismissed the claims against the three violators since they had not ordered 
or executed any of the wrongful transactions.151 
On appeal, however, the SEC abandoned this theory of primary 
liability, and instead argued that the three “aided and abetted PFTC’s 
uncharged primary violations of § 10(b) as implemented by Rule 10b-5, by 
signing the 2002 and 2003 audit letters.”152 This was probably a sensible 
concession in the circumstances. Why should a unit head be expected to 
circumvent whatever internal up the chain reporting mechanisms may be in 
place, and speak directly to the client? Clearly, the surer duty was the 
fiduciary trust company’s duty to be honest with its client. 
The SEC’s argument in the district court is intriguing because it would 
support the duty of our hypothetical CFO to disclose the truth to the 
stockholders. The theory was rejected by the district court and was not 
argued on appeal to the First Circuit. Papa is of interest not because of what 
it holds but because, like Schiff, the government sought to hold accountable 
silent witnesses to fraud. In both cases the silence was claimed to be 
wrongful because it was in breach of a duty to disclose the truth to the 
victim of the fraud—the client in Papa, the stockholders in Schiff. The basis 
of the duty urged by the government in Schiff was unclear; possibly it was 
                                                                                                                           
 
149 Securities and Exchange Commission’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to All 
Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss at 12, SEC v. Durgarian, No. 105 CV 12618 (D. Mass. 2005) (citing 
Rayden Engineering Corp. v. Church, 337 Mass. 652, 660–61 (1958)) (regular employees of an agent 
are sub-agents and have a similar duty to the principal); see also Spritz v. Brockton Sav. Bank, 305 
Mass. 170, 172 (1940) (in light of this duty, “[t]he principal has a right to be informed of all material 
facts known to the agent in reference to the transaction in which he is acting for his principal, and good 
faith requires a disclosure of such facts by the agent”); SEC v. Cochran, 214 F.3d 1261, 1265 (10th Cir. 
2000) (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980)) (a duty to disclose may be present 
if some authority, such as a federal statute, state statute, or common law recognizes a fiduciary or 
similar relationship of trust and confidence giving rise to such). 
150 Papa, 555 F.3d at 37. 
151 Id. at 34. 
152 Id. at 35. This aspect of the case is discussed infra, at Part VI. 
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the same duty articulated by the SEC in Cady Roberts and the Supreme 
Court in Chiarella. The claimed duty in Papa was also problematic, being 
derivative of PFTC’s fiduciary duty to its client, and abandoned on 
appeal.153 In neither case was the theory suggested herein argued. 
A Nevada district court recognized a CFO’s duty to speak in In re 
Agribiotech,154 our sixth case. A company’s CEO made misrepresentations 
about the company’s finances during a meeting with creditors. Also present 
at the meeting were the company’s CFO and its general counsel. They were 
alleged to have known that the CEO’s statements were false, but remained 
silent. The district court held that creditors’ complaint stated a cause of 
action under Nevada law against the general counsel and CFO for their 
negligent failure to disclose. 
The court cited Restatement (Second) of Torts § 551(2) (1977), which 
imposes a duty of reasonable care to disclose facts to one’s counterpart in a 
“business transaction” if, among other things, there is a “fiduciary or other 
similar relation of trust and confidence between them” § 551(2)(a) (the 
court found in an unpublished order that the creditors had “placed 
confidence” in the two155), or if he knows the other party is about to enter 
into the transaction under a mistake as to the basic facts, and, “because of 
the relationship between them, the customs of the trade or other objective 
circumstances,” the other party reasonably would expect the alleged 
tortfeasor to disclose those facts § 551(2)(e).156 The latter rule is the so 
called “termite house” rule. “A sells to B a dwelling house, without 
disclosing to B the fact that the house is riddled with termites. This is a fact 
basic to the transaction.”157 As explained in FDIC v. WR Grace, “when the 
seller has without substantial investment on his part come upon material 
information which the buyer would find either impossible or very costly to 
                                                                                                                           
 
153 Note that a Delaware corporation owes no fiduciary duty to its stockholders. Arnold v. Soc’y 
for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 678 A.2d 533, 539 (Del. 1996). 
154 291 F. Supp. 2d 1186 (D. Nev. 2003) (denying defendants’ motion to dismiss complaint). 
155 Id. at 1192. The factual basis for this finding is not stated in the published opinion. It seems 
unusual that experienced businessmen would not understand that their counterpart’s employees stand at 
arm’s length. 
156 Id. at 1193. 
157 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 illus. 3. 
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discover himself, then the seller must disclose it—for example, must 
disclose that the house he is trying to sell is infested with termites.”158 
Might this duty provide an alternative to a fiduciary’s duty to speak, 
for Rule 10b-5 purposes? The termite house rule does not apply with equal 
force to our hypothetical CFO. It applies only to parties to a “business 
transaction.” There is virtually no authority applying it to a Rule 10b-5 
claim.159 It is a fuzzy rule without clear limits, as the drafters of the 
Restatement acknowledged: “It is extremely difficult to be specific as to the 
factors that give rise to this known, and reasonable, expectation of 
disclosure.”160 This would be especially true if there were no face-to-face 
transaction involving our CFO, who might have only a general idea what 
the multitude of public stockholders expect in the aggregate and no idea 
what any particular stockholder might expect at any moment. Given its 
potential breadth of application, such a rule, if used as the basis for a Rule 
10b-5 duty to disclose, might in effect require an issuer to continually 
disclose all material information, converting the Exchange Act system of 
periodic disclosure to a real time system of continual disclosure. 
It may seem odd to suggest that a breach of duty owed to the board is 
enough to invoke section 10(b), which is meant to protect the stockholders. 
We conclude this section by coming full circle, back to United States v. 
O’Hagan, which solves the apparent conundrum. The Court explained that 
wrongful silence is also the foundation of the “misappropriation” type of 
insider trading.161 
The “misappropriation theory” holds that a person commits fraud “in connection 
with” a securities transaction, and thereby violates § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, when 
he misappropriates confidential information for securities trading purposes, in 
breach of a duty owed to the source of the information. Under this theory, a 
fiduciary’s undisclosed, self-serving use of a principal’s information to purchase 
or sell securities, in breach of a duty of loyalty and confidentiality, defrauds the 
                                                                                                                           
 
158 877 F.2d 614, 619 (7th Cir. 1989). 
159 In re J.P. Jeanneret Associates, Inc., 769 F. Supp. 2d 340, 372 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (rejecting 
the application of the common law rule in a Rule 10b-5 suit). A pair of older cases allowed such claims. 
See Ram Investment Assoc. v. Citizens Fidelity Bank, 1992 U.S. Dist. Lexis 13695; OnBank & Trust 
Co. v. F.D.I.C., 967 F. Supp. 81 (W.D.N.Y. 1997). 
160 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 cmt. l. 
161 Since insider trading law is not the focus of this article, we do not discuss other aspects of 
insider trading, such as tipper-tippee liability, Rules 10b-5-1,-2,-3, Regulation FD, or section 16(b) short 
swing trading. 
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principal of the exclusive use of that information. In lieu of premising liability 
on a fiduciary relationship between company insider and purchaser or seller of 
the company’s stock, the misappropriation theory premises liability on a 
fiduciary-turned-trader’s deception of those who entrusted him with access to 
confidential information.162 
Section 10(b) proscribes the use of any deceptive device in connection with 
the purchase or sale of any security, and the misappropriation theory fits the 
statute. The deception is in keeping the scheme secret from the entruster of 
the information.163 “Because the deception essential to the misappropriation 
theory involves feigning fidelity to the source of information, if the 
fiduciary discloses to the source that he plans to trade on the nonpublic 
information, there is no ‘deceptive device’ and thus no § 10(b) violation—
although the fiduciary-turned-trader may remain liable under state law for 
breach of a duty of loyalty.”164 
The breach in a misappropriation case is of a duty owed to the source 
of the information. The other party to the trade, in contrast, has not been 
defrauded. Fraud against party A may nonetheless be in connection with the 
purchase and sale of securities carried out with party B 
because the fiduciary’s fraud is consummated, not when the fiduciary gains the 
confidential information, but when, without disclosure to his principal, he uses 
the information to purchase or sell securities. The securities transaction and the 
breach of duty thus coincide. This is so even though the person or entity 
defrauded is not the other party to the trade, but is, instead, the source of the 
nonpublic information.165 
Conclusion 
Our examination of relevant case law leads to the conclusion that an 
officer’s breach of his fiduciary duty to disclose material facts to the board 
may constitute a violation of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. We found that 
                                                                                                                           
 
162 O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
163 Section 10(b) requires that a defendant act deceptively. Deceptive acts include omissions by 
those with a duty to disclose. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 
158 (2008). 
164 O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 655. While notification to the source of the information will not 
automatically protect innocent investors, how many schemers will be this bold, and how many sources 
will fail to react coolly to an invitation to join a conspiracy? 
165 Id. at 656. 
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silence, in breach of fiduciary duty can violate § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, 
even where insider trading is not alleged. Where an officer has breached his 
fiduciary duty to the board by remaining silent, he may violate subsections 
(a) and (c) of Rule 10b-5 even if silence does not violate Rule 10b-5(b). 
However, for any such violation to exist, the officer’s silence must still be 
“in connection with” the purchase and sale of securities. 
Our hypothetical CFO’s fraud is consummated . . . when? His silence 
is meant to affect the market price of the corporation’s stock, just as a 
material misstatement about the corporation’s finances, and it is as much in 
connection with market sales and purchases of the corporation’s stock as a 
misstatement. This point is developed below. 
Our CFO violated a fiduciary duty of candor to the board. As more 
fully developed in the next part, although he did not engage in trading 
activity himself, the CFO’s fraud upon the board is nonetheless “in 
connection with” the purchase and sale by others of the corporation’s stock 
in the stock market and thus violated § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 
PART V: IN CONNECTION WITH 
The language of § 10(b) requires that the deception be in connection 
with the purchase or sale of any security.166 The courts have broadly 
interpreted this requirement. 
In Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co.,167 the defendants 
had persuaded the board of directors of the victim corporation, Manhattan, 
to sell its United States Treasury bonds, based on the misrepresentation that 
the sale proceeds would be exchanged for a certificate of deposit of equal 
value.168 In fact, the defendants misappropriated the proceeds. The 
defendants argued that, because the victim of the fraud was Manhattan’s 
board, not the purchasers of the bonds, and because the trading process 
remained “unsullied,” the misrepresentation was not “in connection with” a 
sale of securities as required by § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.169 The Court 
                                                                                                                           
 
166 See generally Thomas J. Molony, Making a Solid Connection: A New Look at Rule 10b-5’s 
Transactional Nexus Requirement, 53 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 767 (2013). 
167 Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971). 
168 Id. at 8 n.1. 
169 Id. at 10. 
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disagreed, noting that, “[t]he crux of the present case is that Manhattan 
suffered an injury as a result of deceptive practices touching its sale of 
securities as an investor.”170 
In United States v. O’Hagan, the Court held that a defendant 
committed fraud in connection with a securities transaction when he used 
misappropriated confidential information for trading purposes.171 The Court 
reasoned that “the fiduciary’s fraud is consummated, not when the fiduciary 
gains the confidential information, but when, without disclosure to his 
principal, he uses the information to purchase or sell securities.”172 
Accordingly, “[t]he securities transaction and the breach of duty thus 
coincide,” and “[t]his is so even though the person or entity defrauded is not 
the other party to the trade, but is, instead, the source of the nonpublic 
information.”173 
In SEC v. Zandford, the Woods granted Zandford, a broker, discretion 
to manage their account and a power of attorney to engage in securities 
transactions for their benefit without prior approval.174 Relying upon 
Zandford’s promise to conservatively invest their money, the Woods 
entrusted him with more than $400,000, all of which Zandford 
misappropriated. Zandford had sold securities in the Woods’ account and 
then made personal use of the proceeds. Each sale was deceptive because it 
was neither authorized by, nor disclosed to, the Woods. The fraud was upon 
them, not upon the purchasers of the securities. The Supreme Court held 
that Zandford’s deceptive conduct was nonetheless, “in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security” within the meaning of § 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5, because the securities sales and Zandford’s fraudulent practices 
“were not independent events.”175 The securities transactions and the 
breaches of fiduciary duty coincided.176 
It might be objected that these three cases are inapplicable since, 
unlike those defendants; our hypothetical CFO did not buy or sell stock. 
                                                                                                                           
 
170 Id. at 12–13 (emphasis added). 
171 United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
172 Id. at 656 (emphasis added). 
173 Id. 
174 SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813 (2002). 
175 Id. at 819–20. 
176 Id. at 820. 
304 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 32:255 
 
Vol. 32, No. 2 (2014) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2014.66 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
The objection would be incorrect. In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur,177 the 
court held that Congress, in using the phrase “in connection with,” 
“intended only that the device employed, whatever it might be, be of a sort 
that would cause reasonable investors to rely thereon, and, in connection 
therewith, so relying, cause them to purchase or sell a corporation’s 
securities.”178 The court went on to say that “[t]here is no indication that 
Congress intended that the corporations or persons responsible for the 
issuance of a misleading statement would not violate the section unless they 
engaged in related securities transactions. . . .”179 
To touch, to coincide, consummation, the courts’ metaphors are 
imprecise. In a 2009 opinion, the Fourth Circuit articulated “several 
factors” to be considered, which  
include, but are not limited to: (1) whether a securities sale was necessary to the 
completion of the fraudulent scheme, (2) whether the parties’ relationship was 
such that it would necessarily involve trading in securities, (3) whether the 
defendant intended to induce a securities transaction, and (4) whether material 
misrepresentations were disseminated to the public in a medium upon which a 
reasonable investor would rely.180 
A court will presume investor reliance on omitted information if the 
information is material, i.e., there is a substantial likelihood that a 
reasonable shareholder would consider it important to know.181 The 
materiality of the omission also satisfies the “in connection with” 
requirement. In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,182 the Second Circuit held 
that “Rule 10b-5 is violated whenever assertions are made . . . in a manner 
reasonably calculated to influence the investing public . . . .” Subsequent 
decisions have refined Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., and several circuits now 
agree that: 
                                                                                                                           
 
177 SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc). 
178 Id. at 860. 
179 Id., quoted with approval in Steiner v. Ames Dep’t Stores, Inc., 991 F.2d 953, 965 (2d Cir. 
1993). 
180 United States SEC v. Pirate Investor LLC, 580 F.3d 233, 244 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal 
quotations and citations omitted). 
181 Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153–54 (1971); TSC Indus. v. 
Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 499 (1976). 
182 401 F.2d at 862. 
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Where the fraud alleged involves public dissemination in a document such as a 
press release, annual report, investment prospectus or other such document on 
which an investor would presumably rely, the “in connection with” requirement 
is generally met by proof of the means of dissemination and the materiality of 
the misrepresentation or omission.183 
Conclusion 
Our CFO intended by his silence to allow a colleague to disseminate 
materially false information in a public forum, to securities analysts and 
thence to the market as a whole. The channel stuffing scheme could 
succeed only if the market overvalued the corporation and its stock. A share 
of its stock, however, has only such price as a buyer actually promises to 
pay in an actual securities transaction. Market trading of the corporation’s 
securities was thus necessary to the completion of the channel stuffing 
scheme. The CFO’s silence directly and immediately affected the price of 
the corporation’s publicly traded stock. 
Since our hypothetical CFO remained silent in order to affect the 
market price of the corporation’s stock, his failure to inform the board is “in 
connection with” the purchase and sales of the corporation’s securities and 
constitutes a violation of Rule 10b-5. He is, therefore, a primary violator of 
§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 
PART VI: SECONDARY LIABILITY 
Unlike an injured private investor, both the Department of Justice and 
the SEC may enforce Rule 10b-5 violations against aiders and abettors, as 
well as primary violators.184 Having determined that our hypothetical CFO 
is subject to criminal liability as a primary violator of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5, we now ask whether our CFO’s silence might make him secondarily 
liable for having aided and abetted the false statement fraud of his colleague 
(see subsection A, below), or perhaps as a control person (see subsection C, 
                                                                                                                           
 
183 Pirate Investor LLC, 580 F.3d at 249 (internal citations omitted). 
184 Private party claims may not be brought against aiders and abettors. Cent. Bank of Denver, 
N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994); Stoneridge Inv. Partners LLC v. 
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008). 
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below). Subsection B deals with a question about primary liability, raised 
by a case discussed in subsection A. 
A. Secondary Liability for Aiding and Abetting 
It is very unlikely that our CFO will be criminally liable for aiding and 
abetting. As developed in this subpart, mere silence is insufficient to satisfy 
the “assistance” element of aiding and abetting. 
Aiding and abetting liability in criminal cases is governed by 18 
U.S.C. § 2(a), “Whoever commits an offense against the United States or 
aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is 
punishable as a principal.”185 Criminal aiding and abetting under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2, requires the defendant to have known of the crime, wanted it to 
succeed, and acted affirmatively to assist it. The mere presence of a 
defendant where a crime is being committed even coupled with knowledge 
by the defendant that a crime is being committed, or the mere acquiescence 
by a defendant in the criminal conduct of others even with guilty 
knowledge is not sufficient to establish aiding and abetting.186 
While the focus of this article is on criminal liability, we consider SEC 
civil enforcement to the extent that it shines additional light on the question 
whether silence can constitute assistance. SEC civil enforcement is 
governed by § 20(e) of the Exchange Act.187 
For purposes of any action brought by the Commission . . . any person that 
knowingly or recklessly provides substantial assistance to another person in 
violation of a provision of this chapter, or of any rule or regulation issued under 
this chapter, shall be deemed to be in violation of such provision to the same 
extent as the person to whom such assistance is provided.188 
In a civil enforcement action against an aider and abettor, the SEC must 
prove: “(1) the existence of a securities law violation by the primary (as 
opposed to the aiding and abetting) party; (2) knowledge of this violation 
                                                                                                                           
 
185 See Baruch Weiss, What Were They Thinking?: The Mental States of the Aider and Abettor 
and the Causer Under Federal Law, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1341 (2002) (emphasizing the minimal actus 
reus requirement under the statute, and the different understandings of the mens rea element). 
186 United States v. Sabhnani, 599 F.3d 215, 239 (2d Cir. 2010). 
187 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2010). 
188 Id. 
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on the part of the aider and abettor; and (3) ‘substantial assistance’ by the 
aider and abettor in the achievement of the primary violation.”189 
It is unclear whether mere silence and inaction can constitute 
substantial assistance. “The question how far mere inaction . . . can fulfill 
the requirement of substantial assistance is unsettled.”190 Some courts 
impose aiding and abetting liability for inaction if there exited an 
independent duty to disclose.191 If the defendant were under a duty to 
disclose, as our hypothetical CFO arguably is, then his silence might also 
make him liable as an aider and abettor, but such liability would be 
duplicative. 
Other courts have taken the view that mere inaction can constitute 
substantial assistance even in the absence of an independent duty to 
disclose if but only if there was a “conscious intention” to forward the 
violation of Rule 10b-5.192 
This language can be traced back to SEC v. Coffey: “Inaction may be a 
form of assistance in certain cases, but only where it is shown that the 
silence of the accused aider and abettor was consciously intended to aid the 
securities law violation.”193 Yet there appears to be no published case in 
which the court actually held someone liable on that basis.194 
Consider again SEC v. Papa.195 Unlike our hypothetical case, in which 
the fraud is ongoing and fresh and might be nipped in the bud if disclosed, 
the wrong in Papa was stale—over and done with. The fraud had ended one 
                                                                                                                           
 
189 SEC v. Apuzzo, 689 F.3d 204, 206 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal citations and quotation marks 
omitted). 
190 ITT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 925 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding no aiding and abetting liability). 
191 ITT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d at 925; Edwards & Hanly v. Wells Fargo Securities, 602 F.2d 478, 
484 (2d Cir. 1979) (dictum). 
192 ITT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d at 926. 
193 493 F.2d 1304, 1317 (6th Cir. 1974). 
194 Cases often cited for this proposition include Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Insurance 
Co., 417 F.2d 147, 155 (7th Cir. 1969) (court expressly did not decide whether silence alone would give 
rise to aiding and abetting liability); Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 97 (5th Cir. 1975) 
(no aiding and abetting liability found); SEC v. Coffey (one aiding and abetting claim dismissed, another 
remanded for a new hearing); Schneberger v. Wheeler, 859 F.2d 1477, 1480 (11th Cir. 1988) (no aiding 
and abetting liability); Moore v. Fenex, Inc., 809 F.2d 297, 303-04 (6th Cir. 1987) (no aiding and 
abetting liability); Woods v. Barnett Bank, 765 F.2d 1004, 1010 (11th Cir. 1985) (real assistance 
rendered); Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793, 800 (3d Cir. 1978) (defendant’s 
conduct aided the fraud); Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 889 (3d Cir. 1975) (no aiding and 
abetting liability found). 
195 SEC v. Papa, 555 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 2009). 
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and two years before the three signed the letters. One cannot substantially 
assist, and therefore cannot aid and abet, a completed wrong. To that, the 
SEC argued that PFTC had an ongoing fiduciary duty to disclose the truth 
to its clients, and that the audit letters signed by the defendants had assisted 
the breach of that duty. Still, the court of appeals didn’t bite. The false audit 
letters may constitute an obstruction of justice or some other wrong, but one 
who later denies knowledge of a fraudulent transaction and is otherwise not 
liable for it, does not become so unless the fraud is ongoing and assisted by 
the lie.196 
Moreover, since the greater includes the lesser, if signing a false 
certificate after the fact does not substantially assist a completed fraud, then 
mere silence cannot be substantial assistance either, and failing to disclose a 
completed fraud cannot make one an accomplice. The false “no” spoken by 
the other officer is the primary violation in our hypothetical case. Although 
the channel stuffing scheme was ongoing, the primary violation was 
complete when the analyst call ended and our silent CFO could not 
thereafter assist it. 
In its brief in Papa, SEC argued that silence would be sufficient to 
meet the “substantial assistance” requirement: As noted by the First Circuit 
in Tambone, “[a] defendant’s silence or inaction may satisfy the ‘knowing 
and substantial assistance’ standard if such silence or inaction was 
consciously intended to further the principle [sic] violation.”197 
However, the SEC’s quotation from Tambone is taken out of 
context.198 As we discuss below, Tambone further supports the conclusion 
that mere silence cannot constitute aiding and abetting. The defendants in 
Tambone actually used false documents, written by others, in their sales 
activity.199 Thus the Tambone court continued, “[h]aving reached this 
conclusion, we need not address, as the district court did, whether the 
defendants’ inaction was accompanied by a ‘conscious intent[ ] to further 
the principal violation.’”200 
                                                                                                                           
 
196 Id. at 37–38. 
197 Tambone, 550 F.3d at 144 (citing Cleary v. Perfectune, 700 F.2d 774, 777 (1st Cir. 1983)). 
198 Tambone, 550 F.3d 106 (1st Cir. 2008), vacated on other grounds, SEC v. Tambone, 597 F.3d 
436 (1st Cir. 2010). 
199 550 F.3d at 145. 
200 Id. at 146 n.48. 
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In Tambone, two senior executives of a broker-dealer that underwrote 
and marketed mutual funds gave their customers prospectuses—written by 
an affiliated company—that contained representations about the funds’ 
prohibition of a practice known as “market timing.” According to the 
pleadings, the two defendants approved arrangements allowing certain 
preferred customers to engage in market timing. Hence, the prospectuses 
contained a material misrepresentation. 
The SEC seems also to have alleged an actionable omission, though it 
is not clearly described in the appellate opinions. The omission may have 
been the failure of the two executives to clarify or correct the misleading 
statement made by another person in the prospectuses.201 The key language 
is in the opinion of the court en banc, reversing in part the judgment of the 
panel: there would be such a duty to speak only if the two stood in a 
fiduciary or other relationship to their clients. 
The SEC brought a civil enforcement action, charging the two 
executives with, inter alia, primary violations of § 10(b) of the Exchange 
Act and § 17(a)(2) of the Securities Act, and aiding and abetting violations 
of both statutes by the involved corporate entities in violation of § 20(e) of 
the Exchange Act. Specifically, the SEC alleged that the defendants 
substantially assisted Columbia Advisors and Columbia Distributor in 
committing acts of primary liability under the securities laws. By 
overseeing the distribution of fund prospectuses which they knew (or were 
reckless in not knowing) were false, the defendants allegedly assisted these 
entities in making false statements.202 
The district court dismissed the § 17(a)(2) claim and the § 10(b) claim 
(specifically, a Rule 10b-5(b) claim), because the defendants were not the 
“makers” of misleading statement. The aiding and abetting claim was also 
dismissed. 
                                                                                                                           
 
201 The majority wrote, “. . . the district court rejected the Commission’s allegation that Tambone 
and Hussey owed a duty to the investors to whom they sold the funds. It wrote: ‘[A]n individual owes a 
duty to clarify a misleading statement only if that statement is attributable to the individual.’” Id. at 117–
18. However, the dissent did not believe that the case presented an omission. “The SEC’s attempt in this 
case to employ Rule 10b-5(b) to punish such a breach impermissibly equates a passive omission—
failing to correct a false statement made by another—with the affirmative misconduct that the language 
of the rule targets.” Id. at 153. And, “In this civil enforcement action, the SEC accuses the defendants of 
sins of commission, not sins of omission; that is, of making untrue statements of material fact.” Id. at 
150. 
202 550 F.3d at 116–17. 
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There were two appellate reviews, first by a panel of the First Circuit 
and later by the court en banc. According to the panel:203 
• The § 17(a)(2) claims should not have been dismissed by the 
district Court. This survived en banc review. We pass over it, as 
inessential to our discussion. 
• So too, the Rule 10b-5(b) claim should not have been dismissed. 
The panel adopted an “implied statement” theory to find that the 
defendants had made the misleading statements. This holding was 
reversed by the full court, and we will consider it shortly. 
• The aiding and abetting claim was sufficiently pleaded and should 
not have been dismissed by the district court. This survived en 
banc review, and bears closer examination. The panel said three 
things: 
The defendants’ failure to correct the misleading disclosures 
in the prospectuses, given their duties as underwriters, as 
well as their use of those prospectuses to sell the funds to 
investors, substantially assisted Columbia Advisors in its 
own violation.204 
Defendants’ conduct in overseeing the distribution of the 
false prospectuses to potential investors amounted to 
affirmative acts in substantial assistance of the primary 
violations.205 
Having reached this conclusion, we need not address, as the 
district court did, whether the defendants’ inaction was 
accompanied by a “conscious intent[ ] to further the principal 
violation.”206 
May we conclude that if the two hadn’t used the prospectuses to sell the 
funds, there could be no aiding and abetting liability? The language isn’t 
entirely clear. 
Anticipating the Supreme Court’s opinion in Janus Capital Group v. 
First Deriv. Traders,207 the First Circuit, en banc208 reversed one holding of 
                                                                                                                           
 
203 SEC v. Tambone, 550 F.3d 106 (1st Cir. 2008). 
204 Id. at 145. 
205 Id. 
206 Id. at 146 (emphasis added). 
207 Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011). 
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the panel, affirming the district court’s dismissal of the Rule 10b-5(b) 
claim. Using is not making, and since the defendants did not “make” the 
statements at issue, they cannot be primary violators of Rule 10b-5(b). The 
en banc opinion was critical of the “implied representation” theory of 
liability adopted by the panel, equating it with a duty to disclose material 
information not included in a prospectus prepared by another. Chiarella and 
its progeny impose such a duty only where there is a fiduciary or other 
similar relationship between the parties. No such allegation seems to have 
been made.209 And here is the key point: If there were such a relationship, 
the breach would be a primary violation under 10b-5(b).210 This statement 
is problematic for two reasons. It is at variance with Affiliated Ute and 
Laurienti, which suggest that fiduciary silence claims are covered by 
subsections (a) and (c), not (b), and because the Janus case, which we will 
shortly consider, suggests that pure silence cases may not be brought under 
subsection (b). 
Nor does Cleary, also cited by in the SEC’s brief in Papa, support the 
theory that mere silence or inaction can amount to aiding and abetting, even 
if consciously intended to help the primary wrongdoer. 
Courts are not in agreement as to the standard to be applied to determine 
whether inaction, such as the failure of the defendants in this case to inform 
anyone that they were not directors at the time the Offering Memorandum was 
issued, can constitute knowing and substantial assistance of the primary 
violation. Several courts have suggested that absent an independent duty to act, 
inaction cannot constitute the assistance necessary to support the imposition of 
liability for aiding and abetting . . . ([I]naction can create aider and abettor 
liability only when there is a conscious or reckless violation of an independent 
duty to act.). Other courts have held that in the absence of an independent duty 
to act mere inaction will constitute substantial assistance only where there was a 
conscious intention to further the principal violation. 
We need not determine which standard should be applied in this case 
because it is clear that the plaintiffs’ affidavits fail to present sufficient evidence 
to raise as a genuine question whether the defendants consciously intended to 
                                                                                                                           
 
208 Tambone, 597 F.3d 436 (1st Cir. 2010). 
209 Only those broker-dealers that exercise discretion or control over customer assets, or have a 
relationship of trust and confidence with their customers, are found to owe customers a fiduciary duty. 
See, e.g., United States v. Skelly, 442 F.3d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Szur, 289 F.3d 200, 
211 (2d Cir. 2002). 
210 Tambone, 597 F.3d at 448. 
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further McHugh’s allegedly fraudulent scheme. Brennan v. Midwestern United 
Life Insurance Co. . . . does not dictate a contrary result. In Brennan the Seventh 
Circuit, upon finding that the defendant knew of the fraudulent activity and did 
not expose it in order to benefit itself, affirmed the imposition of liability as an 
aider and abettor for inaction combined with [defendant’s] affirmative acts. . . . 
In this case, not only did plaintiffs fail to identify any affirmative acts for which 
defendants might be liable, they failed to produce any evidence from which it 
might be inferred that defendants’ inaction was consciously intended to further 
McHugh’s allegedly fraudulent activity. For these reasons, the district court’s 
grant of summary judgment for defendants on the ground that they did not 
knowingly and substantially assist any primary violation was proper.211 
Apply this to our hypothetical CFO. Plainly his colleague lied. The liar (and 
via respondeat superior, the corporation) will be liable as primary violators. 
It seems unlikely that the mere silence or inaction of the CFO will make 
him an aider and abettor. If our hypothetical CFO is to be criminally liable, 
it must be in conjunction with an independent duty to act, which would give 
rise to primary liability.212 
The foregoing establishes that mere silence about another’s Rule 10b-5 
violation does not make one an aider and abettor. Our CFO will be liable, if 
at all, as a primary violator. 
B. Primary Liability Reexamined—Janus Capital Group v. First Deriv. 
Traders213 
Tambone’s suggestion about the application of Rule 10b-5(b) makes 
Janus relevant to our inquiry. Janus Capital Management (“JCM”) served 
                                                                                                                           
 
211 Cleary v. Perfecture, 700 F.2d 774, 778–79 (1st Cir. 1983) (citing Wessel v. Buhler, 437 F.2d 
279, 283 (9th Cir.1971)); Landy v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., 486 F.2d at 161-62. Cf. IIT v. 
Cornfeld, 619 F.2d at 927; Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d at 96-97; SEC v. Coffey, 493 
F.2d at 1317; Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Insurance Co., 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
212 Aagaard, supra note 80, at 1245, 1272–73 (In Criminal Law: The General Part, Glanville 
Williams noted the general rule that mere acquiescence cannot constitute aiding and abetting, and 
asserted that a corporate officer’s acquiescence in the misconduct of the company’s employee s does not 
make him responsible for their illegal actions. However, he also argued that, “where a person has the 
right to control another, his inactivity may be taken as evidence of encouraging the conduct, making him 
guilty as abettor.” The cases on which Williams relied, primarily British, included owners of cars who 
knowingly allowed their drivers to drive dangerously and were found guilty of aiding and abetting 
dangerous driving, and masters who knowingly allowed servants to act illegally.). 
213 Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2296. 
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as investment adviser and administrator to the Janus Investment Fund 
(“Fund”), a separate but affiliated legal entity. The Fund issued 
prospectuses. JCM participated in their writing and dissemination, but 
without attribution. The prospectuses allegedly misrepresented the market 
timing practices and policies of the Funds. Investors in JCM’s parent sued 
for damages. Rule 10b-5(b) states that it “is unlawful for any person, 
directly or indirectly, to make any untrue statement of a material fact.” The 
case turned on the meaning of the verb “to make.” 
The Court held that JCM could not be held liable because it did not 
“make” the alleged misstatements in the prospectuses. Only the maker of 
the statement can be held liable in a private action under Rule 10b-5(b) for 
material misstatements, and even one who prepares a statement on behalf of 
another is not its maker.214 
. . . in the ordinary case, attribution within a statement or implicit from 
surrounding circumstances is strong evidence that a statement was made by—
and only by—the party to whom it is attributed. This rule might best be 
exemplified by the relationship between a speechwriter and a speaker. Even 
when a speechwriter drafts a speech, the content is entirely within the control of 
the person who delivers it. And it is the speaker who takes credit—or blame—
for what is ultimately said.215 
In our hypothetical case, it was the CFO’s colleague who spoke. Janus 
would limit liability to him alone if Rule 10b-5(b) applies. It should not, 
and Tambone’s suggestion that it does seems mistaken. 
Subsections (a) and (c) address scheme liability. Subsection (a) 
proscribes schemes to defraud, while subsection (c) prohibits a course of 
business which operates as a fraud. There is authority for the view that pure 
fiduciary silence is governed by subsections (a) and (c), in contrast to 
misstatements and half-truths which are governed by subsection (b). The 
Supreme Court in Affiliated Ute held the promoters’ silence to violate 
subsections (a) and (c), and the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Laurienti, 
citing Chiarella, suggested that a fiduciary who had made no statements to 
anyone should be charged under subsections (a) and (c).216 The Ninth 
Circuit’s reading of the Rule in United States v. Laurienti is faithful to the 
                                                                                                                           
 
214 Id. at 2302. 
215 Id. 
216 United States v. Laurienti, 611 F.3d 530, 539–41 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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text of the Rule. Rule 10b-5(b) refers to misstatements and half-truths. It 
does not purport to cover pure silence cases. “Subsection (b) of Rule 10b-5 
prohibits the telling of material lies and prohibits the telling of material 
half-truths, where the speaker ‘omit[s] to state a material fact necessary in 
order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under 
which they were made, not misleading.’”217 Other court of appeals opinions 
which discuss the differences among the subsections of the rule are 
consistent with this understanding: the Eighth and Ninth Circuits rejected 
the application of subsections (a) and (c) in cases that involved half-truths, 
which were governed instead by subsection (b).218 
The point is not clear, however. Other authority suggests that the case 
against our silent CFO arises under subsection (b): Our CFO’s silence is 
deceptive only because of the corporation’s public misrepresentations about 
its finances, and therefore, the case really is one for misstatement under 
subsection (b).219 If so, perhaps our silent CFO might be regarded as the 
maker of the misleading statement. By what strange magic might he be 
deemed the maker of the statement uttered by is colleague? “The maker of a 
statement” held the Court in Janus, “is the entity with authority over the 
content of the statement and whether and how to communicate it. Without 
such authority, it is not ‘necessary or inevitable’ that any falsehood will be 
contained in the statement.”220 It was the Janus Funds which had this 
authority, which is why the writer, JCM, was not the maker. Since the CFO 
is entrusted with control of the firm’s financial reporting and public 
disclosure, a plausible case can be made that our hypothetical CFO had 
ultimate authority regarding the statement made by his colleague. And yet 
the Court’s opinion in Janus turned on the plain meaning of the verb to 
make. “One ‘makes’ a statement by stating it.”221 Though the appeal to the 
CFO’s authority is consistent with the language of the opinion, the 
                                                                                                                           
 
217 Id. at 539. 
218 Pub. Pension Fund Grp. v. KV Pharm. Co., 679 F.3d 972, 986–87 (8th Cir. 2012); WPP 
Luxembourg Gamma Three Sarl v. Spot Runner, Inc., 655 F.3d 1039, 1057–58 (9th Cir. 2011) (There 
was no allegation of fiduciary silence in either case.). 
219 SEC v. Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d 340, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); SEC v. Sells, 2012 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 112450, at *8 (N.D. Cal. 2012); In re Smith Barney Transfer Agent Litig., 884 F. Supp. 2d 152, 
161 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
220 Janus, 131 S.Ct. at 2303. 
221 Id. at 2302. 
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argument it is wholly inconsistent with the plain meaning of the word 
“makes.” While it may make sense to find that one person has ultimate 
authority over written statements issued in the name of the corporation, 
such as pres releases,222 it makes little sense to say that person has authority 
over the spontaneous verbal utterances of another. 
In sum, Janus held that subsection (b) applies only to the maker of a 
statement and would preclude a case against our silent CFO. Yet Tambone 
correctly anticipated the logic and holding of Janus, and First Circuit en 
banc suggested that our silent CFO violated Rule 10b-5(b). On the other 
hand, Affiliated Ute and Laurienti suggest that the case against our CFO is 
governed by subsection (a) or (c). If that is correct, Janus presents no 
obstacle to the primary liability of our CFO. 
C. Control Person Liability 
The reference in Janus to the authority and control of a defendant to 
make a statement suggests two other possible bases for secondary liability. 
The federal criminal aiding and abetting statute provides for the liability of 
a mastermind who uses an innocent dupe to carry out the crime.223 If our 
CFO had instructed his colleague to lie, the CFO would be liable just as 
though he had made the false statement. This additional element connotes 
action. It takes the case beyond the realm of pure silence, the subject of this 
exploration, and we do not pursue the line of thought. 
The authority and control of the CFO over the corporation’s financial 
disclosure also suggests the possibility of “control person” liability. § 20(a) 
of the Exchange Act provides, 
Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under any 
provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall also be 
liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled person 
to any person to whom such controlled person is liable (including to the 
Commission . . .), unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did not 
                                                                                                                           
 
222 In re Pfizer Inc. Securities Litigation, 936 F. Supp. 2d 252 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
223 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) (2013) (stating, “Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly 
performed by him or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a 
principal”). 
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directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of 
action.224 
A prima facie case requires proof of at least two elements: (1) that a 
primary securities law violation was committed by another, and (2) that the 
executive charged with control person liability had control over the primary 
violator.225 
As against our hypothetical CFO, the primary violation would be his 
colleague’s material misstatement. The CFO’s control can be established by 
any “indirect means of discipline or influence short of actual direction,”226 
or an “ability to exert influence, directly or indirectly, over the decision 
making process of another,”227 or “the power to direct or cause the direction 
of the management and policies of a person, whether through the ownership 
of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise.”228 This would not seem 
difficult to establish, given the dominant role played by the CFO with 
respect to the corporation’s finances.229 
While intriguing, the likelihood of criminal control person liability 
seems remote. One writer concludes that “[a] criminal charge under § 20(a), 
while a theoretical possibility, is extremely unlikely and has not been 
previously brought.”230 The statute has no mens rea requirement. 
In contrast, a civil enforcement action by the SEC is a realistic 
possibility.231 The elements of a prima facie case vary from circuit to 
                                                                                                                           
 
224 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2013). 
225 Brianna L. Gates, The SEC on a Forum Shopping Spree: SEC Enforcement Power and 
Control Person Liability After Dodd-Frank, 99 IOWA L. REV. 393, 396 (2013); In re Nat’l Century Fin. 
Enter., Inc., Inv. Litig., 504 F. Supp. 2d 287, 301 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (The law is “unsettled” as to whether 
a control person must have actually exercised his capacity to control.). 
226 Sennott v. Rodman & Renshaw, 414 U.S. 926, 929 (1973). 
227 KEVIN F. O’MALLEY ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL § 162.222 
(6th ed. 2012). 
228 SEC v. First Jersey, Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1473 (2d Cir. 1996). 
229 See In re Digi Int’l, Inc. Sec. Litig., 6 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1101 (D. Minn. 1998) (complaint 
adequately alleged that defendant Wall, the Chief Financial Officer and Vice President of Digi, had the 
requisite authority and knowledge to be liable under section 20(a)). 
230 Adam Felsenthal, The Blindsided Insider: Insider Trading Liability for Supervising a Rogue 
Trader, 61 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 167, 193 (2013). 
231 The SEC may seek monetary penalties against violators, among other remedies. Section 
21(d)(3) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides, 
Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person has violated any provision of 
this chapter, the rules or regulations thereunder, . . . the Commission may bring an action 
in a United States District Court to seek, and the court shall have jurisdiction to impose, 
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circuit.232 The most stringent are applied by the Second and Third Circuits, 
where a plaintiff must prove three things: (1) a primary violation, 
(2) control of the primary violator by the defendant, and (3) that the 
defendant was in some meaningful sense a culpable participant in the 
primary violation. The first two elements are the same as those required by 
the majority of circuits.233 The third element—culpable participation—
connotes activity, and takes the case out of the realm of pure silence. Pure 
silence does not make one an aider and abettor or a control person under 
this formulation. 
The First, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits do 
not require the third element to make out a prima facie case.234 A plaintiff 
need only show (1) that a primary securities law violation was committed 
by another, and (2) that the control person had the power to control the 
activity giving rise to the primary violation. Both can be shown in our 
hypothetical case. The CFO’s colleague committed the primary violation 
and our CFO had by virtue of his position the power to control his 
colleague. An officer’s involvement in the preparation of the corporation’s 
financial statements is an indicator of control.235 
The SEC has brought control person enforcement actions against 
CFOs. In 2009, the SEC charged former American International Group 
(“AIG”) Chairman and CEO Maurice “Hank” Greenberg and former Vice 
Chairman and CFO Howard Smith for their involvement in numerous 
improper accounting transactions that allegedly inflated AIG’s reported 
financial results between 2000 and 2005. The complaint alleged that 
Greenberg and Smith were liable as control persons for AIG’s violations of 
the antifraud and other provisions of the securities laws. The defendants 
                                                                                                                           
 
upon a proper showing, a civil penalty to be paid by the person who committed such 
violation. 
15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3) (2012). Similarly, § 21B(a)(2) permits the imposition of civil penalties in 
administrative proceedings against any person who “is violating or has violated any provision of [the 
Exchange Act], or any rule or regulation issued under [the Exchange Act]” or who is or was “a cause of 
the violation.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2(a)(2) (2012). 
232 Gates, supra note 225, at 405. 
233 Id. at 407–08. 
234 Id. at 405. 
235 SEC v. Todd, 642 F.3d 1207, 1223 (9th Cir. 2011); Adams v. Kinder-Morgan, 340 F.3d 1083, 
1109 (10th Cir. 2003). 
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settled the charges.236 At about the same time, the SEC brought another 
control person case against a CFO, alleging liability for the corporation’s 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act violations. Those charges were also 
settled.237 
Section 20(a) expressly provides an affirmative defense if the 
controlling person acted in “good faith.” A control person acts in good faith 
where he takes precautionary measures to prevent the controlled party from 
causing injury to someone else.238 It would be surprising if our silent CFO, 
deliberately indifferent to his colleague’s fraud, could persuade anyone of 
his good faith in the matter. We have assumed his culpable mental state 
throughout this exploration. 
Conclusion 
We saw in subpart A that our CFO’s silence would not make him an 
aider and abettor of his colleague’s fraud. Following the discussion of 
Tambone in subpart A, we returned to the question of primary liability in 
subpart B and saw that the cases are not in accord as to whether a 
fiduciary’s silence is actionable under subparts (a) and (c), or (b), of Rule 
10b-5. If subpart (b) applies to the case against our hypothetical CFO, it is 
unclear whether Janus allows a claim against one who is not the maker of a 
false statement. We resumed our consideration of secondary liability in 
subpart C, and saw that our CFO might be liable as a control person in a 
civil SEC enforcement action. 
We are now prepared to grapple with reasoning of the Third Circuit in 
Schiff. 
                                                                                                                           
 
236 SEC Charges Hank Greenberg and Howard Smith, SEC Litigation Release No. 21170 (Aug. 6, 
2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2009/lr21170.htm. 
237 SEC Charges Nature’s Sunshine Products, Inc. with Making Illegal Foreign Payments, SEC 
Litigation Release No. 21162 (July 31, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/ 
2009/lr21162.htm. 
238 Carpenter v. Harris, Upham & Co., Inc., 594 F.2d 388, 394 (4th Cir. 1979) (“In order to satisfy 
the requirement of good faith it is necessary for the controlling person to show that some precautionary 
measures were taken to prevent an injury caused by an employee.”). See also John H. Walsh, Right the 
First Time: Regulation, Quality, and Preventive Compliance in the Securities Industry, 1997 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 165, 227 (1997) (“[G]ood faith and noninducement is shown by maintaining an adequate 
preventive system.”). 
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PART VII: COMING TO TERMS WITH SCHIFF 
Our hypothetical is based on the facts of United States v. Schiff. The 
defendant was the CFO of Bristol Meyers Squibb. The Third Circuit and 
the district court dismissed the government’s claim that Schiff’s silence 
violated Rule 10b-5, but allowed other charges based on Schiff’s 
misstatements to stand.239 The Third Circuit recognized that precedent did 
not allow for the existence of a duty to correct another’s misstatement and 
that, as a matter of policy, such a duty was vague and open ended and 
therefore unsuitable for criminal enforcement. However, the court’s 
understanding of the fiduciary silence rule seems mistaken, and there are 
straightforward answers to the court’s concerns about the scope of the duty. 
The court’s conclusion is, nonetheless, defensible. There is the law’s 
antipathy for punishing mere silence—the demise of misprision of felony, 
the absence of secondary liability—which, coupled with the rule of lenity, 
supports the holding. Janus was not discussed in Schiff because it was 
decided a year later, but it suggests that the Schiff court correctly read Rule 
10b-5(b). Against Schiff are: the possibility that the case against our CFO is 
based on subsection (a) or (c), so that Janus does not apply, or that 
subsection (b) supports the claim, as suggested by Tambone; the misreading 
of precedent by the Schiff court; and the arguments made thus far in this 
                                                                                                                           
 
239 Schiff and his colleague Lane entered into deferred prosecution agreements with the 
Department of Justice in June 2010. Schiff, the focus of our attention, paid $225,000, and was barred 
from serving as an officer of a public company for two years. David Voreacos, Ex-Bristol-Myers’s 
Executives Prosecution in Fraud Case Deferred in Deal, BLOOMBERG NEWS (June 29, 2010, 6:17 PM), 
available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-06-29/ex-bristol-myers-s-executives-prosecution-
in-fraud-case-deferred-in-deal.html. 
The SEC filed a civil enforcement action against both of them, which was settled in March 2012. 
Schiff was enjoined from violating §§ 17(a)(2) and (3) of the Securities Act of 1933, disgorged 
$130,922, and was barred for one year from serving as an officer or director of a public company. 
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Frederick S. Schiff and Richard J. Lane, SEC Litigation 
Release No. 22313 (Mar. 20, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2012/ 
lr22313.htm. 
Bristol paid $150 million in 2004 to settle a related SEC civil enforcement action. Press Release 
2004-105, U.S. SEC, Bristol-Myers Squibb Company Agrees to Pay $150 Million to Settle Fraud 
Charges (Aug. 4, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-105.htm. And in 2005, it 
entered into a deferred prosecution agreement with the Department of Justice, which effectively put the 
company on probation for two years, Deferred Prosecution Agreement, available at http:// 
www.law.virginia.edu/pdf/faculty/garrett/bristol-meyers.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2014). 
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article. Schiff’s holding is one possible answer, within reason, but because 
of the flaws in the opinion, it cannot be the final answer. 
Precedent 
The cases cited by the Third Circuit in support of its narrow reading of 
a duty to disclose do not support the court’s conclusion. The court 
explained what it believed to be the governing principles: 
Absent a duty to disclose, silence is not fraudulent or misleading under Rule 
10b-5. . . . We explained in Oran v. Stafford that a duty to disclose under Rule 
10b-5 may arise in three circumstances: “when there is [1] insider trading, [2] a 
statute requiring disclosure, or [3] an inaccurate, incomplete or misleading prior 
disclosure.” To support this proposition, the Oran Court cited to (i) a First 
Circuit Court of Appeals en banc opinion, Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 910 F.2d 
10, 12 (1st Cir. 1990) (en banc), explaining that a duty to disclose arises in the 
same three circumstances listed in Oran, (ii) a Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
opinion, Glazer v. Formica Corp., 964 F.2d 149, 157 (2d Cir. 1992), noting that, 
absent the same three circumstances, there is no duty to speak, and (iii) a District 
of Delaware Court opinion, In re General Motors Class E Stock Buyout Sec. 
Litig., 694 F. Supp. 1119, 1129 (D. Del. 1988).240 
The first ground, insider trading, is a narrowly stated version of the 
fiduciary silence rule. As we have seen, however, Affiliated Ute does not 
require the rule to be read so narrowly, a view confirmed by the Second, 
Ninth and Tenth Circuits (and suggested by the First).241 Silence can be a 
violation of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 even in cases not involving insider 
trading.242 The cases cited by the Oran court do not support such a narrow 
reading, either. 
Backman concerned the existence and scope of a duty to update a 
statement made in a third quarter report which was true at the time it was 
made. Ours is not a duty to update case. The senior officer’s statement in 
                                                                                                                           
 
240 United States v. Schiff, 602 F.3d 152, 162 (3d Cir. 2010). 
241 The Third Circuit used Rule 10b-5(b) as the “relevant legal grounding” to the appeal. Schiff, 
602 F.3d at 161. This may have been because of an odd procedural aspect to the case. The government’s 
specific argument was that Schiff should have rectified Lane’s misstatements in a subsequent SEC 10-Q 
filing, apparently trying to avoid the effect of an earlier stipulation it made that eliminated all allegations 
concerning misstatements in Bristol’s SEC filings. Id. at 161–62. Whatever the reason, a better legal 
grounding may have been Rules 10b-5(a) and 10b-5(c), as per Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United 
States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972). 
242 See supra text accompanying notes 128–63. 
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our hypothetical case was false when it was made. In Tambone, the First 
Circuit, which decided Backman, recognizes a broader fiduciary silence 
rule than the Third Circuit.243 
Glazer involved undisclosed preliminary buyout negotiations. The 
defendant had made no public statement. The Second Circuit concluded 
that “[t]here was no suggestion that defendants . . . made any public 
statements other than the September Releases. Those releases were not false 
or misleading. . . .”244 Our case involved a false and misleading public 
statement. Further, the Second Circuit in DiBella recognized a broader 
fiduciary silence rule than did the Third in Schiff.245 General Motors 
likewise involved the non-disclosure of negotiations.246 
The Third Circuit in Schiff also found fault with the government’s 
fiduciary duty theory. “The Government argues that Schiff’s duty to 
disclose in the SEC filings derives from a general fiduciary obligation of 
‘high corporate executives’ to the company’s shareholders, which it 
concedes is not one of the three circumstances described in Oran.”247 The 
court doubted such a duty existed: 
The Government cites to a Supreme Court case, Chiarella v. United States . . . to 
demonstrate that fiduciary obligations can be federalized in the securities law 
context. Chiarella involved insider trading charges against a printing company 
hired by a corporation to print corporate takeover bids. While the Court 
discussed fiduciary obligations, it did so in the context of insider trading, an 
entirely different situation than the one before us.248 
While the federal duty to disclose to stockholders probably is limited to 
insider trading cases, as discussed above, Rule 10b-5 encompasses more. 
Other wrongful instances of fiduciary silence can violate the Rule, as 
illustrated by Affiliated Ute and the cases decided by the Second, Ninth and 
Tenth Circuit courts discussed above. 
Moreover, the theory suggested herein is different from that urged by 
the government in Schiff. The CFO here owes a fiduciary duty of candor to 
the corporation’s board. The existence of this duty is beyond doubt. That 
                                                                                                                           
 
243 Tambone, 550 F.3d at 144–45. 
244 Glazer v. Formica Corp., 964 F.2d 149, 157 (2d Cir. 1992). 
245 SEC v. DiBella, 587 F.3d 553 (2d Cir. 2009). 
246 In re General Motors Class E Stock Buyout Sec. Litig., 694 F. Supp. 1119 (D. Del. 1988). 
247 Schiff, 602 F.3d at 163. 
248 Id. at 165–66. 
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the breach of this duty might also constitute a violation of Rule 10b-5 does 
not, as the Third Circuit feared, “encroach into conduct traditionally left to 
state corporation law,”249 so long as there is deception which is “in 
connection with” the purchase or sales of securities as required by the 
language of section 10(b). 
Policy 
The Schiff court wondered about the vagueness of the government’s 
proposed duty. To whom does it apply? The government said “high 
corporate officers.” But, “what company employees qualify as high 
corporate officers?”250 
There are two possible answers. 
1. As suggested by criminal omission theory, the CFO of a publicly 
traded corporation would have a duty to speak, since it is especially his job 
among management to police financial statement fraud. Since the duty is 
not based on corporate law principles, it could be owed directly to the 
stockholders, and in that way resembles the government’s theory in Schiff 
of the duty of a high corporate officer to stockholders. While consistent 
with basic ideas of criminal culpability, the theory finds no support in 10b-5 
jurisprudence as a basis for primary liability, beyond the insider trading 
cases. The CFO’s status may provide a basis for civil control person 
liability, though, as discussed above. 
2. A better answer, then, is any officer subject to a duty of candor to 
the board of directors. While this is a broad category, only if the breach of 
that duty is “in connection with” the purchase or sale of any security would 
the breach also constitute a primary violation of section 10(b). 
The court of appeals also wondered what exactly the performance of 
the duty might require. It referred to a colloquy between the district court 
and the prosecutor. The district court asked, “Are they required in front of 
investors to have an argument back and forth?” The government answered, 
                                                                                                                           
 
249 Id. at 165 (citing Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472, 478–80 (1977)). 
250 The phrase “high corporate officers” is undefined. Schiff, 602 F.3d at 164. Exchange Act Rule 
3b-7 defines the phrase “executive officer.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-7 (2013); and the Principles of Corp. 
Governance § 1.33 (1994) defines a “senior executive.” 
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“They’re required to correct it in some way when they have the time.”251 
Our response refers to the language of MBCA § 8.42(b)(2). The 
performance of the duty requires a report to superior authority within the 
corporation of violations of law that have occurred. 
Other concerns voiced by the Schiff court are also answered by 
reference to § 8.42(b)(2). The district court asked, “What if he about [the 
misstatements] the next day?”252 It commented that “[b]efore people can be 
charged with a crime, they have to know what they’re supposed to do.”253 
The court of appeals elaborated these concerns by quoting Schiff’s brief, 
which argued that 
a fiduciary presumably would owe shareholders a duty “to rectify” public 
misstatements of others whenever they are made (on a conference call or, say, in 
a written report or on the internet), whoever makes them (a fellow employee or, 
say, a securities analyst), and however the fiduciary learns about them (by 
hearing them on a joint call or, say, by reading them in a newspaper).254 
It hardly seems a stretch, though, to assume that the CFO of a publicly 
traded corporation would know that he should report “up the chain” a false 
statement made at his side in a public forum. Such a duty is fully consistent 
with the special role of the CFO. 
The court of appeals asked, for how long would this duty attach?255 
One might look for guidance to the duty to correct one’s own 
misstatement.256 The duty lasts as long as the misinformation is “alive” in 
the minds of investors, affecting the market as a continuing representation. 
The duty expires when the uncorrected misrepresentation ceases to be 
material and investor reliance may no longer be presumed.257 
                                                                                                                           
 
251 Schiff, 602 F.3d at 164 n.4. 
252 Id. 
253 Id. 
254 Id. at 165. 
255 Id. 
256 See supra note 118. 
257 Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 465 F. Supp. 904, 908 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). 
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PART VIII: CONCLUSION 
There are flaws in the Third Circuit’s opinion in Schiff which, when 
considered in combination with the special status of the CFO, suggest that 
the Third Circuit’s opinion should not be the final word. 
The theory of liability suggested herein is consistent with the general 
theory of criminal omissions, is based upon a clear breach of the CFO’s 
duty of candor owed to the corporation’s board of directors, and is therefore 
also consistent with finding a violation of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, 
since the CFO’s silence was in connection with the purchase and sale of the 
corporation’s securities. 
Janus, decided a year after Schiff, may present an obstacle to the 
prosecution of our CFO. Janus limits primary liability under Rule 10b-
5(b)—concerning misstatements and half-truths—to the maker of the 
statement. Our CFO made no statement at all. Yet there is authority for the 
view that pure silence cases against a fiduciary are governed by the two 
other subparts of the Rule. If that is correct, then the prosecution will be 
able to avoid Janus. In either case, there remains the possibility of an SEC 
civil enforcement action against our CFO as a control person. 
